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INTRODUCTION 
Ronald A. Brand 
The Conference Context 
In its Advisory Opinion issued on July 22, 2010, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) addressed the question posed by the General Assembly, “Is the 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?.”1 The Court 
answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the declaration was not 
prohibited by general international law or any other source of international law.2 
The Court was careful to delineate what it was not asked, and thus what it did not 
answer: 
The question posed by the General Assembly . . . does not ask about the legal 
consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not 
Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal 
effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as 
an independent State.3 
Nevertheless, Kosovo has moved forward on the basis of the declaration and has 
created the framework of a state. That process began before the February 17, 2008 
Declaration of Independence. The ICJ noted the importance of “the factual context 
which led to its adoption.”4 This context included Security Council Resolution 
1244, which authorized the Secretary-General, in response to the conflict between 
Kosovo and Serbia, to establish a presence in Kosovo in order to provide “an 
interim administration for Kosovo . . . which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions.”5 The Secretary-General established the 
                                                          
 
1 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 49 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Opinion]. 
2 For a good brief overview of the Advisory Opinion, see Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Lawfulness of Kosovo’s 
Declaration of Independence, 14 ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 17, 2010), available at http://www.asil.org/ 
insights/volume/14/issue/27/lawfulness-kosovos-declaration-independence. 
3 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 1, ¶ 51. 
4 Id. ¶ 57. 
5 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
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United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999, 
headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who took on all 
executive and legislative authority for Kosovo, including supervision of the 
judiciary.6 UNMIK regulation 2001/9 of 15 May 2001 provided a “Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government” of Kosovo.7 This regulation was 
followed by rounds of unsuccessful negotiations at which Serbia and Kosovo 
considered the status of Kosovo.8 Nonetheless, the situation moved forward with 
elections for an assembly of Kosovo in 2007 and the Declaration of Independence 
on February 17, 2008. The Republic of Serbia rejected the Declaration, stating that 
it “represented a forceful and unilateral secession of a part of the territory of Serbia, 
and did not produce legal effects either in Serbia or in the international legal 
order.”9 
The Conference 
On October 22–25, 2012, judges, government officials, and scholars from 
Kosovo and the United States gathered at the University of Pittsburgh for a 
conference on “Kosovo after the ICJ Opinion.” The conference was organized by 
the Center for International Legal Education (CILE) at the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law, and the University of Prishtina Faculty of Law. It was co-sponsored 
by the Ministry of Justice, Kosovo; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kosovo; the 
Forum for Civic Initiatives, Kosovo; the American Society of International Law 
(ASIL); and the Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies at the University 
of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies. 
While the Advisory Opinion influenced much of the discussion, the principal 
purpose of the conference was not to consider the Advisory Opinion or the issues 
of international law it both addressed and has generated. Rather, the principle 
purpose was to discuss the current state of affairs in Kosovo after the ICJ Opinion, 
and the challenges and opportunities faced by the people of Kosovo. Each 
participant brought expertise and experience to the issues discussed. These issues 
were arranged around four general themes: 1) the constitutional and legal 
framework of Kosovo; 2) economic development; 3) cooperation and effective 
reform in the judiciary and legal education; and 4) opportunities for long term 
                                                          
 
6 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 1, ¶¶ 60–61. 
7 Id. ¶ 62. 
8 Id. ¶¶ 64–69. 
9 Id. ¶ 77. 
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development, particularly in light of the broader implications of the ICJ opinion. In 
addition to the four panels, the Honorable Enver Hasani, President of the 
Constitutional Court of Kosovo, delivered the 20th Annual McLean Lecture on 
World Law as part of the Conference. 
The conference was organized in order to provide as much time for group 
discussion as for the presentation of papers. Thus, the Report which follows is not a 
common printing of papers that were prepared for the conference. Neither is it 
organized in the order that issues were presented at the conference. It is rather an 
effort to turn the discussion from the conference into a coherent review of 
important issues facing Kosovo as it moves forward after the Advisory Opinion. 
The Report 
The Report that follows uses the words of the conference presenters, taken 
from their papers, but seeks coherence and concision in order to provide a review 
of multiple issues in a readably brief format. Each section of the Report reflects the 
conference discussion through a modification of the paper originally prepared by 
the author listed for that section. 
Part I of the Report, “Getting to Independence: The Advisory Opinion and 
Beyond,” provides a brief review of the Opinion as well as opinions and reflections 
on the difficulties of emerging statehood. Professor Fred Morrison focuses on both 
recognition and the Opinion. The question of recognition was an important theme 
throughout the conference, acknowledging that Kosovo’s future is closely tied to 
how other states respond, both formally and informally, to its declaration of 
independence. Professor Robert Hayden follows by challenging us to think about 
the difficult issues of territorial partition, secessionist movements, and continued 
ethnic conflict. Professor Henry Perritt, Jr. picks up the problem of ethnic relations 
and minority rights, providing a useful and informative list of the problems (and 
resulting opportunities) Kosovo faces as a nascent state. 
While Part I of the Report provides perspectives from outside Kosovo, Part II 
presents the view of those involved in the day-to-day internal process of state-
building. Professor Iliriana Islami presents a useful survey of constitutional 
development, providing us with the twenty-first century international context that 
defines both the opportunities and limitations of the basic law of any new state. Her 
survey is a reminder that the application of international law did not end with the 
Advisory Opinion, but continues to influence the constitutional framework that will 
define Kosovo. Zana Zeqiri Rudi provides the view from the Kosovo Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, helps us negotiate Kosovo’s unique path from supervised 
international administration to constitutional state, again emphasizing the 
importance of the foreign relations function. Vjosa Osmani, a Member of the 
Kosovo Parliament, provides further indication of the importance of external 
relations to constitutional framework, defining the important role of “Parliamentary 
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Diplomacy,” in demonstrating legitimacy of the new Kosovo state within the 
international community. Her contribution both challenges traditional theory of 
separation of powers in the realm of foreign affairs and explains the real politic of 
Kosovo after the Declaration of Independence. 
Part III of the Report includes views from both inside and outside Kosovo. It 
begins with Katerina Ossenova’s informative and cogent presentation of the current 
economic environment for development in Kosovo. As one would expect from 
someone at the Commercial Law Development Program of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, her review is both substantive and challenging. This external view of 
the development needs of Kosovo is followed by a review of the Privatization 
Agency of Kosovo by three of its officials: Arben Limani, Naim Avdiu, and Mrika 
Tahiri. They help us move from the forest of issues to the individual trees, 
reminding us of the problems of day-to-day efforts to achieve the types of goals set 
out by Ossenova. This focus on the economy is followed by consideration of the 
legal system, with Judge John R. Tunheim sharing observations on the Kosovo 
judiciary gained from personal involvement in efforts at reform. Dean Bajram Ukaj 
adds a useful review of the reform of the criminal laws of Kosovo, demonstrating 
that development requires detail. This review is followed by three sections 
emphasizing the importance of education—and, more importantly, cooperation in 
the education process. Wes Rist and I provide sections reviewing the influence of 
legal education and describing specific cooperation between the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law (through its Center for International Legal Education) 
and the University of Prishtina Faculty of Law. This partnership led to the 
conference, and it is appropriate to describe more of that relationship and its role in 
Kosovo’s development. The Report concludes with Professor Martin Weiss’s 
review of educational cooperation in support of the development of the 
telecommunications sector in Kosovo, providing additional detail to the larger 
framework. 
A number of themes flow throughout the following Report. These include the 
importance of  
 the relationship between international law and a new state 
 the process of international recognition and what recognition means 
 how a new constitution affects and is affected by questions of 
recognition by other states 
 the role of both affirmative rights and limitations in a constitution 
 the relationship between legal reforms and economic development 
 the concept of Supervised Independence 
 the concept of Parliamentary Democracy 
 the role of Europe in Kosovo’s past and future 
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 the relationship between general development and specific laws 
(e.g., a criminal code) 
 the consideration of whether the Kosovo experience is sui generis 
 the relationship between education and legal reforms 
The challenges faced by Kosovo include challenges in foreign relations, 
constitutional development, economic development, judicial reform, and 
educational reform. Kosovo also has its advantages: a young, and increasingly 
educated, population;10 efforts at respect for human rights;11 and support from 
many members of the international community. Our hope here is that this Report 
will serve both to advance the discussion of how those challenges may be met 
utilizing those advantages and to inform not only those involved in that process, but 
also those desiring a better understanding of the process. 
                                                          
 
10 Demographic and economic data is available through the publications of the Agjencia e Statistikave 
Të Kosovës [Kosovo Agency of Statistics], available at http://esk.rks-gov.net/eng/publikimet. 
11 See infra Part II.D. See also Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës [Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosovo] arts. 22–62. 
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PART I—GETTING TO INDEPENDENCE: THE ADVISORY 
OPINION AND BEYOND 
A. Recognition, the Advisory Opinion, and the Future of Kosovo 
Fred L. Morrison* 
1. Introduction 
The disputed status of Kosovo is the story of two issues of international law. 
One issue is of the law of state recognition. When does a new state emerge? What 
are the criteria? The other issue concerns the role of the International Court of 
Justice and, in particular, its opinion in the Kosovo independence case.12 Kosovo’s 
status is also a story about two approaches to international law. One of them is a 
narrow, fixed and inflexible approach, bound to the past. The other is an approach 
that seeks substantial justice for all, looking to the future. 
In both regards, Kosovo’s story demonstrates that the law has moved beyond 
the inflexible and mechanical approaches of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
International law has adapted to accommodate the modern international 
community’s desire for justice, rather than simply providing for mechanical 
jurisprudence. 
2. Self-determination and territorial integrity 
Kosovo’s claim to independence is based primarily on the principle of self-
determination enunciated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter.13 Kosovo 
asserts that its citizens are a “people” as defined in this principle and that they are 
thus permitted to determine their own government. This claim is supported by an 
argument that Serbia had so mistreated the people of Kosovo during the conflict 
that it has lost any legal or moral claim to resume control of the territory.14 
Serbia’s opposition to that claim is based on the principles of territorial 
integrity and domestic jurisdiction, which are found in Article 2 of the United 
                                                          
 
* Popham, Haik, Schnobrich/Lindquist & Vennum Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law 
School. 
12 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 1. 
13 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
14 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, Written Contribution of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 
at 60–69 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf. 
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Nations Charter.15 Serbia claims that territorial changes can only be made with the 
consent of the state from which the territory is being taken, a consent that it is 
unwilling to give.16 Under the Serbian view, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, 
and that Serbia’s territorial integrity cannot be altered without its free consent. 
Serbia also claims that its relationship with the “province” is a matter of domestic 
concern. 
The interplay between these two principles has been a matter of ongoing 
controversy for decades. Since the end of de-colonialization in Africa in the 1970’s, 
many countries have resisted the application of self-determination in other 
contexts, because they fear that it might encourage separatist movements. 
Prominent among the states that oppose statehood for Kosovo are states in which 
there are significant separatist independence movements.17 These states see 
acceptance of the principle of self-determination as weakening their own claims to 
national unity. At most, the states opposing Kosovo’s statehood see self-
determination as providing some more limited form of autonomy. 
3. Recognition 
Recognition is the act by which an existing state acknowledges that another 
international entity is a state. International law is (or, at least traditionally, was) 
primarily about the relationships between sovereign states. Formal recognition was 
traditionally afforded great importance. Recognition was an indication that the 
recipient state of the recognition had become a member of the club of sovereigns in 
the eyes of the recognizing state(s). 
There are two competing theoretical approaches to recognition. One is that 
recognition is constitutive, that only by the acts of other states conferring the status 
does the new state emerge and thus become entitled to participate in the 
international legal community.18 Under this approach, recognition of independence 
                                                          
 
15 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶  4, 7. 
16 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, Written Statement of the Government of the Republic Serbia, at 147–243 (Apr. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf. 
17 Among the states that have declined to recognize Kosovo are Cyprus, in which there is a separatist 
Turkish area, and Spain, which faces claims of independence from the Basque region and from 
Catalonia. 
18 Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605 
(1941); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 109 (1905); HENRY WHEATON, 
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30–31 (6th ed. 1855). 
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by the prior sovereign has a critical role to play in the acceptance of the new state. 
The other approach is that statehood exists on the basis of specific facts, regardless 
of formal recognition.19 The actions of other states in granting recognition are only 
declaratory of the existence of those facts. This more modern theory is buttressed 
by more modern international standards. 
The most succinct statement of standards for recognition can be found in the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,20 an Inter-American 
treaty adopted in 1933. Although this treaty was originally intended only for use in 
the Western hemisphere, it has become a touchstone for the standards to be applied 
in other regions. Under it a new state must have “(a) a permanent population, (b) a 
defined territory, (c) government, and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states.”21 
Applying these standards to Kosovo in 2008, a strong case could be made for 
the existence of statehood. An even stronger case can be made today. Kosovo has a 
defined territory. It has a distinct population. Its laws are routinely applied and 
enforced throughout most of its territory. Its formal recognition today by half of the 
states, including the United States and most of the states of Western Europe, shows 
broad acceptance of it as a participant in international affairs. The Court, however, 
did not reach this issue, because of the way that the question posed to it in the 
request for an advisory opinion was worded. It only addressed the question of 
whether the declaration issued on February 17, 2008 was legal. 
Some states, especially Serbia and Russia, may continue to contest Kosovo’s 
legitimacy. That opposition has consequences. Serbia’s opposition means that there 
are no normal diplomatic relations with an immediate neighbor, although the 
European Union has sought to improve relations between the two entities. Russian 
opposition means that Kosovo cannot obtain membership in the United Nations, 
because it can use its Security Council veto to reject an application for 
membership.22 
                                                          
 
19 JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 81–85 (1928); 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 72–74 (1906); TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 
(1951). 
20 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881, 
3 Bevans 145 (1933). 
21 Id. art. 1. 
22 U.N. Charter, art. 4, ¶ 2. See also, Advisory Opinion Regarding Admission to the United Nations, 
1950 I.C.J. 2. 
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My own view of recognition, as expressed in my 1967 paper, was 
functional.23 In dealing with actions within the territory of Kosovo, members of the 
international community now understand that they must deal with the authorities in 
Pristina, not those in Belgrade, to accomplish results. The nations of Europe have 
joined together to maintain regional peace. The recognition by many of them of 
Kosovo as an independent state should stand as a barrier to any effort to violate the 
territorial integrity of that new state. By any functional analysis, Kosovo now has 
sufficient relations with other members of the international community that it is 
entitled to respect for its independence. 
4. The Advisory Opinion 
In its effort to counter the growing recognition of Kosovo’s independence, 
Serbia sought a ruling from the International Court of Justice that the declaration 
was illegal. Unable to initiate an ordinary contentious case against Kosovo, Serbia 
urged the General Assembly to ask the Court for an advisory opinion on the 
legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
In seeking to resolve the Kosovo issue, Serbia faced a logical problem. Since 
only states can be parties to contested cases before the Court,24 it could not sue 
Kosovo directly in the Court; to do so would admit that Kosovo was a state, which 
would be self-defeating. Instead, Serbia requested the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to seek an advisory opinion from the Court. Unlike a judgment, an 
advisory opinion is not binding, although it is highly persuasive.25 The Court has 
discretion to decline the request in an advisory case, whereas in a judgment, the 
Court must give a decision.26 Unlike contentious cases, in which only the adverse 
parties and those that formally intervene have a right to submit arguments,27 all 
members of the United Nations are entitled to submit their views to the Court for 
                                                          
 
23 Fred L. Morrison, Comment, Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 857 (1967). 
24 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1). 
25 See id. art. 59. 
26 Id. art. 65. 
27 International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, art. 81. 
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consideration in an advisory opinion case.28 Additionally, the Court can also invite 
the views of interested non-state parties,29 and frequently does so. 
According to the Statute of the Court, it is to respond to the question that the 
organization has posed for it.30 In this case, the question asked was simple. The 
General Assembly asked: Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institution of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law? 
The International Court of Justice delivered its opinion on July 22, 2010.31 
The Court devoted much of its reasoning to defining and refining the question. 
After noting that it was not being asked whether the Declaration was effective in 
making Kosovo independent, but only whether the declaration itself was illegal,32 
the Court found that there had been declarations of independence during the 
preceding centuries, some of them had resulted in new states, so it could not be said 
that declarations of independence were per se illegal.33 Then, the Court turned to 
the question of whether the declaration was prohibited by the terms of the authority 
granted to the Assembly of Kosovo as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government established by the United Nations.34 The Court found it unnecessary to 
answer that question definitively by observing that the body that had passed the 
resolution was a body of elected leaders of Kosovo, but was not formally the 
Assembly of Kosovo; i.e., it was not the official Provisional Institution of Self-
Government, but rather an assembly of local notables who were expressing their 
views about independence.35 Since the declaration wasn’t an official action by the 
official Assembly, the declaration of independence could not be contrary to any 
                                                          
 
28 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 66. 
29 In this case, the Court issued an order inviting the authors of the Declaration of Independence of 
Kosovo to submit their views. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence of Kosovo, Order 2008 I.C.J. 409, 410 (Oct. 17). 
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 65. 
31 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 1. 
32 Id. ¶ 51. 
33 Id. ¶ 79. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 80–121. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 102–109. 
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limitation in Security Council resolution 124436 on the actions of official bodies, 
and therefore was not illegal.37 
Thus, the Court reached the conclusion, by a vote of 10 to 4, that the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not 
violate international law.38 Note that this conclusion does not quite match the 
question asked, which was whether the declaration was “in accordance with 
international law.” The Court held that the declaration “did not violate international 
law,” but the Court also made clear that it was not deciding whether the declaration 
had any operative effect.39 The four dissenters primarily emphasized the 
importance of retaining the stability of existing states.40 
The advisory opinion was a victory primarily for the Court. The opinion had 
threaded its way between the demands of Serbia—that the Declaration of 
Independence be declared illegal—and the demands of the authors of the 
Declaration—that the independence be recognized. The Court managed to redefine 
the question into a form that was largely, but not totally, meaningless, and then 
answered that question ambiguously. For Serbia, the opinion was indeed a major 
loss, but for Kosovo, it was not a signal victory. Kosovo received only the benefit 
of a judicial declaration that its Declaration of Independence was not a violation of 
international law, but not a decision that the declaration was effective. 
5. The Path Forward 
If the rules of recognition are evolving, and the advisory opinion is 
ambiguous, what is the path forward for Kosovo? Kosovo must recognize the 
traditional role of recognition, but also capitalize on the changing perception of 
how recognition is granted. To this end, Kosovo has to focus its efforts for 
achieving recognition into three spheres of policy. 
The first imperative is to maintain order and stability in Kosovo, and to 
protect the human rights of all of its residents. Above all, Kosovo must protect the 
rights of minority groups both conspicuously and transparently. One of the later 
                                                          
 
36 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
37 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 1, ¶¶ 109–121. 
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on the merits of the issue). 
39 Id. ¶ 56. 
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decisions of the Badinter Commission in evaluating the claims of the Yugoslav 
states to independence examined those states’ respect for human rights.41 Those 
standards enumerated by the Commission would presumably apply here too. It is 
not enough that minority rights are protected. In order to obtain credibility in the 
world community, Kosovo must be seen by the rest of the world as actively 
protecting minority rights. There must be transparency in that respect. Protection of 
religious and cultural sites of importance to the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and to 
the population of Serbia itself, is also important in this regard. 
The second imperative is to strengthen the economic viability of an 
independent Kosovo. The economy of Kosovo over the past decade has required 
massive infusions of external funds, both to support the international administrative 
and military structures, and to support redevelopment assistance programs in the 
aftermath of the conflict. The nations of Europe are growing weary of extensive 
subsidization of their poorer cousins, as the recent Euro crisis demonstrates. 
The third imperative is to involve Kosovo, to the maximum extent possible, in 
the international affairs of Europe and of the world. The criteria for the recognition 
of statehood have been readily established. Kosovo has formally been recognized 
by many of the countries of Europe and the world. Now Kosovo must be as an 
active participant in the international conversation. Actual participation is more 
important than the accumulation of formal acknowledgements of recognition. In 
some instances participation will be difficult. Formal membership in the United 
Nations is not likely in the near future, because Russia is likely to veto any 
membership application. But, other institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, are more accessible. The World Trade Organization 
may be another such global institution. Active participation in European 
institutions, beginning with the Council of Europe and the European Court of 
Human Rights, is especially important. 
With broad recognition, Kosovo is now a new state. However, Kosovo now 
faces other obstacles and imperatives. With the determination that has guided it 
over recent history, Kosovo is poised to overcome and satisfy these new 
challenges. 
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B. Regional Stability, Unworkable States, and the Obvious but 
Unattainable Solution 
Robert M. Hayden* 
With all due respect for the ICJ and for the title of this conference, Fred 
Morrison has nailed the essence of the matter perfectly in his section of this report: 
“The Court managed to redefine the question into a form that was largely, but not 
totally, meaningless, and then answered that question ambiguously.”42 
Mr. Morrison’s conclusion that, “The advisory opinion was a victory primarily for 
the Court”43 indicates that the basis for decision was one not of legal principle. 
Rather, the Court found a way to prevent picking sides in Big Power politics by 
giving an ambiguous answer to a question it was not asked and avoiding answering 
the one that it was asked. Ultimately, the Court did not determine or say anything 
meaningful at all. 
By avoiding more definitive language, the ICJ opinion has effectively 
determined that international law is not relevant in cases of secession. There are 
secessionist movements, from Catalonia to Quebec to Kashmir, that are quite 
pleased with this development. Also pleased are the Serbs on the one hand and the 
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other. Perhaps the most pleased are the 
local politicians in those parts of Northern Kosovo where the Prishtina government 
does not rule and the population rejects coming under that government’s control. 
By avoiding setting legal precedent, the ICJ opinion ensured that the Kosovo 
secession counts as a real-life, political precedent. This status, unfortunately, avoids 
the logical legal resolution. 
Unless they are negotiated and agreed to beforehand, partitions of territories 
are inherently tenuous; secession movements may fail. In the best-case scenario, 
those secessions that succeed may be legalized after the fact by recognition from 
the state in which they seceded—e.g. Bangladesh by Pakistan, Eritrea by Ethiopia, 
and East Timor by Indonesia. This legalization follows from the principle that a 
state may agree to a change of its borders. What gets messy is when a successful 
secession is not recognized by the state losing territory—e.g. the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, Transdniestria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. 
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42 See supra Part I.A.4. 
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Despite Serbia’s lack of recognition of Kosovo’s independence thus far, this 
conflict does not mean that a solution for the Kosovo situation could not be found. 
It has been clear since before the Kosovo war that Serbia has been willing to 
change its border and thus consider the secession of most of what has become 
Kosovo.44 It was no secret in Belgrade in the late 1990’s that most relevant political 
parties, with the exception of Vojisav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party and Vojisav 
Kostunica’s Serbian Democratic Party, considered partition of Kosovo to be 
potentially favorable.45 In Milosevic’s government, this position was espoused by 
his coalition partner New Democracy. Serbian willingness to partition Kosovo was 
enunciated by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic in preparation for his recent 
meeting in Brussels with Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci Dacic.46 
The legal and political solution to the Kosovo secession is to partition the 
territory, with Serbia retaining the northern Kosovo municipalities of Leposavic, 
Zvecan and Zubin Potok and those parts of the city of Kosovska Mitrovica north of 
the Ibar River. These territories had majority Serbian populations before 1999, and 
are overwhelmingly Serbian now. Other problems could be resolved more easily—
the protection of major Serbian religious sites, tourism to which would benefit 
Kosovo, and resolution of the property issues by ensuring that the Serbs who fled 
received real value for their properties. In return, Kosovo would gain clear title to 
most of the resources, and the infrastructural projects needed by both countries 
could be advanced. 
There are both practical and normative reasons for electing this territorial 
partition. The practical one is that the population of the northern Kosovo region 
rejects inclusion in the Albanian state of Kosovo; note that I say “Albanian state” 
because Kosovo is an ethnocracy. This ethnic majority does not make Kosovo 
unique, or even an outlier, as every independence movement in the former 
Yugoslavia was based on political movements for ethno-national self-
determination, and not that of a population of undifferentiated citizens. Every such 
movement that succeeded has produced systematic discrimination, at best, against 
the most prominent and numerous minorities.47 The Serbs of northern Kosovo 
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should expect a bleaker future should the territory in which they reside come under 
Prishtina’s control. 
There is another reason why partitioning Kosovo would be helpful. The 
refusal to recognize that the various independence movements have been aimed at 
creating ethnocracies has led to the creation of unworkable states. Bosnia does not 
actually exist as a state, since the central government has authority only in the parts 
ruled by Bosniaks, with the Serbs in Republika Srpska and the Croats in Western 
Herzegovina rejecting any effective Bosnian state.48 In Macedonia, recent ethnic 
violence has raised concerns that radical paramilitary groups may seek a forceful 
secession of the western part of the country to create an ethnic Albanian state.49 
Restructuring the states to better match the ethno-national borders would provide 
better chances for these countries to develop governments that are empowered to 
control populations that actually do accept them, and thus become more closely 
bound by the rule of law. 
There is another reason why agreeing to partition Kosovo would aid stability 
in the region. NATO presence would no longer be necessary. Approximately 10% 
of the NATO units in Kosovo are actually drawn from neighboring countries.50 
Effectively, Slovenian, Croatian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops are pitted 
against Serbs, with casualties occurring on both sides. In a region where historical 
memories run long, it is not good policy to create conditions in which military units 
of the neighboring countries are actually brought into conflict. 
Agreeing to the reality of a new border will not solve all problems between 
Kosovo and Serbia, but it would set up the conditions under which most could be 
addressed more effectively. If the northern border of Kosovo with Serbia is not 
redrawn to reflect the clear will of the residents there, we will see either another 
round of ethnic conflict, or a continuation of the current stalemate. For the sake of 
the stability of the region, and of Kosovo and Serbia, the solution of territorial 
partition is far preferable to the current course of unilateral secession. An agreed 
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.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  6 1 0  |  V O L .  7 4  |  2 0 1 3  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
partition would also set a much better practical precedent than the ICJ’s artful 
dodging of the real issues in its opinion in the Kosovo case. 
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C. Declaring Independence Was the Easy Part 
Henry H. Perritt Jr.* 
1. Introduction 
Kosovo declared independence on February 18, 2008. Five years later, 
questions remain about how much independence is worth to the people of Kosovo. 
Economic development is sluggish, the political system is trapped by 
preoccupation with the international community as its most important constituency, 
Kosovo’s best and brightest are alienated from politics, and human rights values 
have penetrated few human hearts. Whether history will mark the Kosovo project 
as a success depends on overcoming these obstacles with a renewal of the spirit of 
1997 and 1998. 
2. The political constituency is the international 
community, not the local peoples 
Kosovo’s century-long struggle for independence convinced much of 
Kosovo’s population that it lacked the capacity to determine its own political 
destiny but instead depended on the will of the great powers. That perception, 
combined with tight control over indigenous Kosovo institutions during the 
UNMIK period and EU supervision after independence, has caused Kosovo’s 
political leadership to be more concerned about satisfying diplomats from other 
states than with satisfying aspirations of its own people. 
The result is a politics for Kosovo that is strangely silent on the issues that 
dominate politics in most other democracies: jobs, economic development, trade, 
elimination of corruption, improvements in the justice system, and presentation of 
new faces as candidates for political leadership. The local press and media are 
filled with stories that hardly change from day to day or month to month, almost all 
of them about the latest statement from Belgrade, Brussels, or Washington on the 
future of the north. Rarely can one find any serious journalism about competing 
economic proposals, plans for education, or concrete initiatives to improve the 
court system. 
3. Economic development is sluggish 
A 2004 Economic Memorandum from the World Bank concluded that:  
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The economy Kosovo inherited in 1999 had been damaged by poor 
economic policies, broken external trade and financial links, international 
sanctions, a lack of investments, and ethnic conflict. The macroeconomic data 
indicate that there has been a recovery of economic activity and positive growth 
since 2000. However, the recent growth performance has been driven by a post-
conflict boom financed by official aid flows and is unlikely to be sustainable.51 
The World Bank strategy document for Kosovo 2012-201552 identified five 
sets of obstacles to doing business: severe infrastructure gaps, deficiencies in the 
rule of law, shortages of appropriately skilled labor, limited access to finance, and 
onerous regulatory procedures for business entry and operations.”53 
An unreliable electricity supply is perhaps the most serious obstacle to 
business expansion, followed by an inadequate transportation system.54 Both have 
been recognized as problems since 1999, yet concrete ideas for expanding 
electricity generation and tying it to regional grids in Albania have received little 
political emphasis. Construction of a new highway to Albania is proceeding 
sluggishly, amid accusations of corruption. Albania’s portion was largely complete 
by 2010, when construction of Kosovo’s portion had barely begun.55 
The absence of a coherent program with respect to remittances provides a 
concrete example of failure in economic policy. Remittances from family members 
working outside Kosovo have been something of a safety value for the Kosovo 
economy. The share of remittances in GDP fell from 17.5% in 2004 to 13% in 
2010, but the World Bank reports that it is still high by regional and global 
standards. The World Bank also notes that no public policy exists to maximize the 
contribution of remittances to Kosovo’s economic development. “No government 
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document of any kind contains policies related to the economic aspects of 
migration.”56 
Agriculture regularly is identified as a sector in which Kosovo has economic 
opportunity; yet no coherent ideas have been expressed on how a badly fragmented 
pattern of minimally subsistent farms can be integrated into production units of 
viable size. 
4. Rule of law barely exists 
The court system is in shambles, with corruption rampant, professionalism 
largely absent, and bizarre decision-making only loosely tied to logical 
interpretations of written law. Opportunities in Kosovo for western levels of 
professional legal education do not exist. The quality of the Kosovar bar is 
abysmal, and yet no provision exists for foreign lawyers to appear formally in 
Kosovo courts—a practice that could provide role models for indigenous lawyers, 
as well as holding the judiciary to higher standards. 
The Kosovo Police Service is professional and highly motivated, but it cannot 
do the job without partners in the judiciary and the bar, including the prosecution 
service. 
5. The best and brightest are alienated from politics 
Kosovo is blessed with many young people educated in Europe and the 
United States. They are ambitious and have strong work ethics. They are, however, 
too remote from politics. 
Political alienation among Kosovo’s youth is pervasive and increasing as time 
passes without tangible progress in matters that affect daily lives. Movement to an 
open-list system for choosing candidates for the Assembly offered opportunities for 
ambitious young political candidates; yet few came forward. Vetëvendosje and 
FER (New Spirit) attracted advocates of change in the 2010 elections, but FER 
failed to meet the 5% threshold for seats in the Assembly and then was merged into 
Vetëvendosje. Vetëvendosje achieved a critical mass in the Assembly but has 
focused on strong nationalist rhetoric and on reviling the older parties and the 
international community rather than offering concrete alternatives in the domestic 
policy arena. The economic planks in its political program oppose privatization and 
advocate subsidies for domestic industry—essentially a return to discredited 
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socialism which ruined the economies of central and eastern Europe before the fall 
of the Soviet Union. 
6. Human rights values have penetrated few human hearts 
Article 3 of the Constitution of Kosovo declares that Kosovo is a multi-ethnic 
society, and that all individuals stand equal before the law in accordance with 
internationally recognized fundamental rights.57 Chapter II guarantees 
“Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.” Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, relation to any community, property, economic and social 
condition, sexual orientation, birth, disability, or other personal status.58 
Kosovo’s political leadership has gone out of its way since 1999 to make 
public pronouncements assuring the equality of Serbs and Roma within Kosovo. 
Yet these values are not yet enshrined in many human hearts in Kosovo. Private 
conversations with Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo Serbs evoke preposterous 
myths about threats from the other and convictions that the two ethnic groups can 
never live together in respect and trust. 
The Kosovo Constitution assures against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Two of this author’s students59 visited Kosovo in the summer of 2012 
to conduct research on the implementation of this provision, interviewing many gay 
and straight Kosovars and internationals. They discovered that the Assembly has 
done nothing to implement the provision against non-governmental sources of 
discrimination, meaning that no mechanisms for enforcement exist against private 
entities such as employers, places of public accommodation or private health care 
providers. Although each ministry and municipality has a human rights unit to take 
complaints of governmental discrimination, these units do not have independent 
budgets or confidentiality mechanisms. The Ombudsperson has not proactively 
invoked his power to send discriminatory laws to the Constitutional Court for 
review. Most young gay men and women live in abject fear of anyone discovering 
who they really are. That is not a free society. 
There are, of course, some enlightened and inspiring voices, some friendships 
forged and maintained across ethnic and other divides. But there are not enough. 
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These voices are still the exception rather than the rule. Bravery seems to be in 
shorter supply now than it was in 1998 and 1999. 
7. Conclusion 
Kosovo’s war is not over yet: there is still too much of a gap between the 
dream and reality. Hopefully new faces will emerge, faces on bodies as brave as the 
KLA soldiers who fought against huge odds in 1998 and 1999. If that happens, like 
America, Kosovo can be free. 
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PART II—ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE STATEHOOD 
D. Building Statehood Through Constitutionalism 
Iliriana Islami* 
1. International Law and the Constitution 
One of the requirements of international law for building statehood is internal 
constitutional sovereignty.60 In most post-conflict societies, developing 
constitutional order is crucial to creating an effective, viable state. As such, the 
constitution emerges as an important limitation on the capacity of the majority to 
exercise political will. This role of a constitution implies that state sovereignty 
should be complemented by other guiding principles, notably the “global common 
interest” and/or “rule of law” and/or “human security.”61 
This external element that shapes sovereignty necessarily conceives that 
international law cares about development of domestic constitutional standards. 
Based on contemporary international legal approaches, the constitutions of states, 
particularly of newly emerging states, come to the forefront in demonstrating these 
new internationalization tendencies.62 In this respect, constitutions forge the 
relationship between international and national law by creating a network of norms 
with the aim of establishing judicial globalization. Thus, constitutional texts, 
legislative texts, and judicial outcomes are influenced by international bodies 
tackling fundamental problems.63 
Kosovo’s constitutional framers accepted that the prevention (or resolution) 
of ethnic conflict is crucial for maintaining stability and peace. Minority rights are 
regarded as an instrument for attaining this stability and are considered as a core 
element of a viable constitutional framework. The drafters were strict in embracing 
international standards to provide rights for Kosovo’s minority Serbian population 
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that would extend beyond European standards.64 This embrace of international 
norms and standards for minority protection is a process that can be characterized 
as the internationalization of constitutional law. 
Beginning in 1991, European states defined criteria according to which they 
would recognize new states in the region.65 These criteria emphasized the guarantee 
of “the right of ethnic and national groups and minorities.”66 The Constitution of 
Kosovo, which came into effect on June 15, 2008, complies with this development 
and takes the additional novel step of using the term “communities” in place of 
“minorities.” This consciousness of minority rights is embodied in Article 3: “The 
Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other 
Communities, governed democratically with full respect for the rule of law through 
its legislative, executive and judicial institutions.”67 
Kosovo is striving to build a modern multi-ethnic society safeguarded by its 
Constitution. Every constitutional system should comply with the functions and 
values of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism has to address the relationship 
between the state and the other emerging, “constitutionalized, levels of governance 
in order to establish legitimacy and coherence.”68 A constitution is a “mirror 
reflecting the national soul”69—the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a 
nation. The Constitutional Court comes to the forefront in revealing this soul 
through its interpretation. Therefore, the Constitutional Court must propound 
values and democratic principles to bond the people and discipline the government. 
I can say that the first year of the work in Kosovo was similar to other 
Constitutional Courts whereby jurisprudence has little to do with the rights of the 
particular named party, but much to do with a desire for national consideration. 
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2. International Law, Statehood, and Constitutional 
Interpretation 
The Constitutional Court is responsible for supporting these values and 
democratic principles through its interpretation of the laws. An interpretation based 
on the spirit of the constitutional framers means priority should be given to 
international law. Article 22 of the Constitution provides that: 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by . . . international 
agreements and instruments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly 
applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority 
over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions.70 
It has since fallen to the Constitutional Court to carry out this mandate to protect 
“community rights” as well as the “constitutional system” which relies on 
international norms. 
The Constitutional Court appears to have established constitutional order in 
its first three years of jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court’s first referral 
addressing multi-ethnicity was filed by Ćemaijl Kurtiśi, Vice Chairperson of the 
Municipality of Prizren, on April 22, 2009.71 The referral claimed that Article 7 of 
the Statute of the Municipality of Prizren was in violation of Articles 3.1, 6.1, 58.1 
and 59.1 of the Constitution because the emblem of the municipality of Prizren 
only recognized the cultural-historical significance of the Albanian community and 
did not transmit a message of multi-ethnicity in a multi-ethnic municipality.72 The 
Constitutional Court found a violation of the Constitution by recalling that: 
“The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and 
other Communities” and equally guarantees the right of communities to use and 
display Community symbols in accordance with the law and international 
standards . . . it also emphasises [sic] the responsibility of the State to promote a 
                                                          
 
70 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, supra note 57, at art. 22. 
71 Gjykata Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] KI 01/09, Judgment dated Mar. 18, 2010, ¶ 3 (Kos.), 
available at http://gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/ko_01_09_Ven_ang.pdf. 
72 Id. ¶ 55. 
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spirit of tolerance and dialogue, and to support reconciliation among 
communities.73 
The Court further recognized that the Albanian Community has been put in a 
privileged position, because it has the dominant position in the Municipality.74 
Therefore, the Court ordered the Municipality of Prizren to change the emblem in 
accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution. 
3. A Good Start 
Decisions such as the one handed down to the Municipality of Prizren have 
started to establish the constitutional order envisioned by Kosovo’s constitutional 
framers. The protection of “community rights” has created a foundation for lasting 
peace and stability. In this context, Kosovo is fulfilling constitutional function of 
legitimizing, limiting and guiding politics. By creating this inner constitutionalism, 
Kosovo is establishing its case for recognition and statehood. However, more work 
is left to be done, both judicially and politically, to ensure that communities are 
effectively integrated into the emerging constitutional order and also to ensure 
Kosovo becomes integrated fully by the international community. 
                                                          
 
73 Id. ¶ 49 (internal citations omitted). 
74 Id. ¶ 51. 
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E. Foreign Policy After the Advisory Opinion 
Zana Zeqiri Rudi* 
Since the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s 
aspiration has been to build a modern, democratic country that is recognized 
internationally. Today, Kosovo is a multi-ethnic democracy demonstrating 
economic growth and private sector potential.75 
1. The End of Supervised Independence 
Kosovo completed the obligations set forth in the Ahtisaari Proposal, which 
brought the end of supervised independence on September 10, 2012.76 Having built 
democratic, functional institutions in a process that was advised, mentored, and 
overseen by the international community, the International Steering Group’s 
decision to end international supervision over Kosovo’s independence is 
considered by Kosovars to be a major accomplishment. This end of supervised 
independence presents Kosovo with a momentous opportunity to take full 
responsibility over its Constitution. 
The ICJ Advisory Opinion is considered by the Kosovo government as 
providing the foundation for exercising constitutional functions. The opinion is 
considered to have implicitly established that (i) States that have not yet recognized 
Kosovo’s independence can do so because Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence 
did not violate general international law; and (ii) there is no support for further 
status talks. On the first point, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has 
undertaken negotiations to obtain state-by-state recognition. 
On the second point, it is important to recall that Kosovo and Serbia engaged 
in a dialogue to determine Kosovo’s political status as determined in Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999).77 As a result, Martti Ahtisaari recommended that 
Kosovo’s status be independent, which led to the Declaration of Independence in 
                                                          
 
* Diplomatic Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kosovo. 
75 See supra note 52. 
76 Kosovo’s “supervised independence” ends, B92.NET (Sept. 10, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://www.b92.net/ 
eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=10&nav_id=82158. 
77 Status Process as of Aug. 1, 2007, UNOSEK, http://www.unosek.org/unosek/. 
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2008.78 The UN General Assembly acknowledged the content of the Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ in the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, and welcomed the readiness of 
the European Union to facilitate a process of technical dialogue between Kosovo 
and Serbia.79 In its resolution 64/298, the UN General Assembly envisioned the 
dialogue contributing to peace, security, and stability in the region.80 The UN 
General Assembly envisioned that the technical dialogue between Kosovo and 
Serbia would advance the path to European Union membership for both.81 In this 
way, the issue was moved from the General Assembly to the European Union (in 
the framework of good neighborly relations and regional cooperation). 
One of Kosovo’s main goals is integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. To 
this end, Kosovo engaged in technical dialogue with Serbia in March 2011.82 The 
dialogue—under EU facilitation as stipulated by the UN General Assembly—
produced seven bilateral agreements on issues like university diplomas, custom 
stamps, integration border management, and regional cooperation and 
representation.83 
After the Advisory Opinion and the General Assembly’s resolution for the EU 
facilitated dialogue, the European Union integration process became a real 
endeavor. The possibility of EU Membership shapes Kosovo’s political, economic, 
and cultural direction. Kosovo shares European values. Kosovo institutions have 
reinforced their EU integration objective by engaging in the technical dialogue with 
Serbia as stipulated by the General Assembly. 
                                                          
 
78 U.N. Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK), Addendum to Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council—Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007). 
79 G.A. Res. 64/298, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/64/298 (Sept. 9, 2010). 
80 See William Hague, U.K. Foreign Sec., Statement in Response to General Assembly Resolution 
64/298 (Sept. 10, 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-on-un-
general-assembly-resolution-on-icj-advisory-opinion-on-kosovo. 
81 See id. 
82 “Three main topics” in Belgrade-Pristina talks, B92.NET (Mar. 7, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.b92 
.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&dd=07&nav_id=73106. 
83 See, e.g., Serbia and Kosovo sign deals, ALJAZZERA (July 2, 2011, 10:31 PM), http://www.aljazeera 
.com/news/europe/2011/07/201172202625940367.html; Serbia and Kosovo reach deal to end mutual 
trade embargo, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.dw.de/serbia-and-kosovo-reach-deal-to-
end-mutual-trade-embargo/a-15362158-1?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf. 
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Kosovo has received recognitions from 22 out of 27 EU Member States, as 
well as EU candidate states Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Turkey.84 Securing recognition from the other five members is essential. Kosovo’s 
efforts to deepen cooperation with these members have started to bear fruit, with a 
recent decision by Slovakia to accept passports issued by Kosovo.85 
Kosovo has worked closely with the EU in completing a Feasibility Report. 
Through the process of a Feasibility Study, a path towards negotiations to sign a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU has been established. Late in 
the spring of 2012, Kosovo officially received the visa liberalization roadmap 
adopted by the European Commission.86 
Kosovo has experienced transitions, war, and the instability of international 
administration in its path to an independent state looking to join the EU. Kosovo’s 
internationally-facilitated path to independence, the significant number of state 
recognitions, its membership in regional and international organizations, and the 
Advisory Opinion set the stage for the future of Kosovo. 
                                                          
 
84 A list of official recognitions is maintained by Ministria E Punëve Të Jashtme [the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs], available at http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33. 
85 Slovakia recognizes Kosovo passports, TOP CHANNEL (July 20, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.top-
channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=6538. 
86 Department of Home Affairs (EC), Press Release IP/12/605 (June 14, 2012), available at http:// 
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-605_en.htm. 
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F. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kosovo: The Role of 
Parliamentary Diplomacy in State-Building 
Vjosa R. Osmani* 
Developing and executing foreign policy has been one of the biggest 
challenges for the Republic of Kosovo post-independence. As the youngest nation 
in Europe, and until recently the youngest country in the world, Kosovo’s 
challenges in the state-building process are unique, especially in terms of 
recognition. 
Historically speaking, foreign affairs have been at the heart Kosovo’s politics. 
This focus was true during the nineties, when the Government-in-exile established 
informal representation offices in important decision-making countries. These 
representation offices, without diplomatic accreditation, managed to 
internationalize Kosovo’s struggle for independence under the leadership of 
Kosovo’s historic President, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. 
The Declaration of Independence of February 17, 2008, did not simplify 
Kosovo’s foreign affairs. However, the establishment of core institutions to lead 
this process, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made the challenges easier to 
address. The Advisory Opinion, which ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence is not in violation of any applicable rule of international law, 
strengthened Kosovo’s international position and its quest for further recognitions. 
Kosovo’s endeavor to achieve full recognition of its statehood and to secure 
membership in key international organizations remains a priority. The problems 
encountered in this path are as unique as the path Kosovo has taken towards its 
independence. 
1. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kosovo Before 
Independence 
The abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy by the Milosevic regime in 1989 was 
followed by the organization of a parallel system and the election of a shadow-like 
Government that provided the people of Kosovo with basic services like education 
and medical care.87 While most key pillars of this Government were functioning 
with difficulties, President Rugova’s resistance movement and his Government-in-
                                                          
 
* Member of Parliament (LDK), Member on the Committee for European Integration, and Assistant 
Professor, University of Prishtina Faculty of Law. 
87 УСТАВ РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРБИЈЕ (1990) [USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 6, 109 (Srb.). 
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exile saw foreign policy as one of their key priorities.88 During this time, there was 
no active role of the Parliament in foreign policy development. Members of 
Kosovo’s Parliament had been chased out of the Parliament building forcefully, 
which was surrounded by tanks.89 Parliament organized the Constitutional 
Declaration of 2 July 1990 and adopted the Constitution on 7 September 1990, 
which finally led to the organization of the Referendum for Kosovo’s independence 
in 1991.90 
Despite these historical activities, most Members of the resulting Kosovo 
Parliament either lived in exile or were arrested by Serbian forces. Thus, there was 
no direct involvement of the Parliament in diplomacy. Kosovo’s case eventually 
did become international in 1999, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 allowed an international civilian and military presence in Kosovo.91 
Accordingly, NATO intervened, with the resulting removal of Serbian military, 
police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.92 While a number of functions were 
transferred from UNMIK to Kosovo authorities over the course of nine years of 
UNMIK administration, foreign policy remained an area where the local 
institutions had very little power.93 The Constitutional Framework94 provided that: 
[e]xternal relations, including with states and international organisations, as may 
be necessary for the implementation of his mandate. In exercising his 
responsibilities for external relations, the SRSG will consult and co-operate with 
                                                          
 
88 See Ibrahim Rugova: Pacifist at the crossroads, BBC (May 5, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/110821.stm. 
89 See generally MARC WELLER, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1989–1999, at 60–62 (1999). 
90 Id. at 64–65. 
91 S.C. Res 1244, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
92 History of KFOR Deploys, NATO—KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR), http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-
us/history.aspx. 
93 Prindon Sadriu & Vjosa Osmani, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kosovo, in BALKANS—FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, POLITICS AND SOCIO-CULTURES 62 (Cüneyt Yenigün & Ferdinand Gjana eds., 2011). 
94 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Institutions of Self Government, adopted in 2001, 
created the legal basis for the powers of Kosovo local institutions during the UNMIK administration. 
Moreover, it outlined the so-called “reserved powers” which belonged to the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General of the United Nations. 
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the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government with respect to matters of 
concern to the institutions.95 
A number of international agreements were signed by UNMIK on Kosovo’s behalf 
during this period, and in particular, Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) were 
concluded with some countries in the region.96 UNMIK was also participating in all 
regional and international meetings on behalf of Kosovo. In some instances, even 
when the representatives of the local Kosovo institutions would be invited, an 
UNMIK official had to be present in the delegation. During the 1999–2008 period, 
UNMIK was mainly concerned in dealing with foreign policy issues connected to 
regional relations and practical issues such as trade.97 Even during this period, 
however, the President of Kosovo, the Prime Minister, and a number of Ministers 
were receiving several foreign dignitaries and also travelling abroad on the 
invitation of their counterparts.98 
The role of Kosovo institutions in foreign affairs became quite significant 
once the Vienna talks for the final status of Kosovo began in 2006. Kosovo was 
only represented by the local institutions; UNMIK was not part of the Kosovo 
delegations in this process.99 Except for preparations for the negotiations with 
Serbia, which were mediated by the UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari, 
Kosovo institutions independently controlled their foreign policy agenda. This 
agenda focused on bilateral meetings with individual nations.100 In each of these 
bilateral relations, Kosovo had two primary objectives: first, to gain the support of 
individual countries for Kosovo’s position in the negotiations, and second, to gain 
their support for recognition of independence, once it would happen. Furthermore, 
                                                          
 
95 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK Reg. 2001/9, art. 8.1(o), U.N. 
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001). 
96 Sadriu & Osmani, supra note 93, at 63. 
97 KOSOVAR INST. FOR RESEARCH & DEV., KOSOVO’S FOREIGN POLICY: STRATEGIC FACTORS, 
OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES 6 (2007), available at http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/ 
67832_foreign_policy.pdf. 
98 See, e.g., Kosova Daily Report #1669, 99-01-20, HELLENIC RESOURCES NETWORK, http:// 
www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/1999/99-01-20.ksv.html#01. 
99 See supra note 77. 
100 See, e.g., Macedonia and Kosovo prime ministers discuss the border-issue, PRAVADA (May 5, 2006), 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/05-05-2006/79964-kosovo-0/. 
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Kosovo was actively engaged in establishing positive relations with neighboring 
countries.101 
During the UNMIK governance, all Kosovo local institutions were considered 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), as established by the 
Constitutional Framework.102 These PISG included the Assembly, Kosovo’s 
legislative arm.103 The powers of the legislature, however, were limited and 
allowed it only to adopt laws that were subject to final promulgating by the 
UNMIK representative.104 Since Kosovo did not have a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Assembly could not adopt laws that related to the functioning of 
foreign policy. It did, however, have a very significant role in giving legitimacy to 
the entire negotiation process for the final status.105 The Assembly voted to endorse 
negotiations and to appoint the Unity Team, which aimed at informing the 
Assembly on the flow of negotiations and the bilateral relations with other states.106 
The Assembly received frequent reports from the President, who was the head of 
the Unity Team. 
As expected, once the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement (also known as the Ahtisaari Plan)107 was presented, it received 
overwhelming support from the Assembly of Kosovo.108 In preparation for the 
Declaration of Independence, Parliament’s role in foreign affairs was enhanced 
                                                          
 
101 See id. 
102 UNMIK Reg. 2001/9, supra note 95, at art. 1.5. 
103 Id. at art. 1.5(a), 9.1.1. 
104 Id. at art. 9.1.45. Cf. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Deplores Kosovo Assembly’s 
Resolution Concerning Province’s ‘Territorial Integrity,’ In Presidential Statement, U.N. Press Release 
SC/7413 (May 24, 2002). 
105 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2006/45 (Jan. 25, 2006). 
106 Id. 
107 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 26 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Addendum, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007). 
108 See generally, KOSOVO DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ¶ 1 (Kos. 2008) (“This declaration reflects 
the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.”). 
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through two new Parliamentary Committees: the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
and the Committee for European Integration.109 
2. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kosovo after 
Independence 
When independence was declared, Kosovo had several institutions and 
ministries that had been established during the UNMIK administration, but no 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The establishment of this institution after the 
Declaration of Independence was wrought with challenges. Among these 
challenges was a lack of professional diplomatic expertise.110 Kosovars were not 
able to participate in the former Yugoslav diplomatic service, unlike citizens from 
the other former Yugoslav regions.111 Consequently, Kosovo did not have a pool of 
career diplomats to help the country during its early establishment phase. 
Everything had to be built from scratch. Despite this lack of expertise, the process 
was smoother than expected. During the first year of independence, Kosovo 
established 20 Embassies around the world and a Consulate General in New York 
to cover diplomatic activities at the United Nations. 
The process to further develop the diplomatic service is closely linked to the 
recognition process. Kosovo cannot establish a diplomatic mission in a country 
until that country recognizes Kosovo’s independence.112 On the date of Kosovo’s 
Declaration of Independence, the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo sent a 
request for recognition to all United Nations Member States, and several 
international organizations, proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
Seventeen countries recognized Kosovo in the first week.113 This number was up to 
69 when the ICJ opinion was published on July 22, 2010.114 In June 2009, Kosovo 
became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
                                                          
 
109 KOSOVAR INST. FOR RESEARCH & DEV., MAPPING OUT THE CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
OF THE SECURITY SECTOR IN KOSOVO 14 (2008), available at http://www.kipred.org/ 
advCms/documents/21596_PARLIAMENTARY_OVERSIGHT_OF_THE_SECURITY_SECTOR.pdf. 
110 KOSOVAR INST. FOR RESEARCH & DEV., supra note 97, at 34. 
111 See generally, G.A. Res. 48/153, ¶ 18(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/153 (Feb. 7, 1994) (alluding to the 
mass dismissal of Ethnic Albanian civil servants by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 
112 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 2, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
113 See note 10 in section E supra. 
114 Id. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  6 2 8  |  V O L .  7 4  |  2 0 1 3  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
(WB).115 These memberships marked a significant diplomatic success for Kosovo, 
as both the IMF and the WB are UN specialized agencies.116 Furthermore, support 
for membership into the IMF came from some nations which have not yet 
recognized Kosovo.117 
a. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kosovo after the 
ICJ Opinion 
The ICJ Advisory Opinion strengthened Kosovo’s case in the international 
arena. The Opinion meant that countries had no legal reason to postpone 
recognition. The concern that Kosovo’s independence could be used as a precedent 
for other breakaway provinces seeking independence should not have been an issue 
because Kosovo’s independence was factually unique.118 No country in the world 
has declared independence based on Kosovo’s example. The only independent 
country emerging after Kosovo was South Sudan, which achieved its independence 
under completely different circumstances. 
Kosovo is now recognized by nearly half of the United Nations Member 
States.119 Its own membership in the United Nations is blocked by Russia, who has 
threatened to use its veto at the UN Security Council if Kosovo applies for 
membership.120 The UN Security Council must make a recommendation for 
Kosovo’s membership before it is voted on at the General Assembly.121 This 
obstacle will not stop Kosovo from securing membership in other international 
organizations, however. Efforts are underway to secure membership in the Council 
                                                          
 
115 Press Release, Dept. St., Kosovo Joins the IMF and World Bank (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125489.htm. 
116 Structure and Organization, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/index.shtml. 
117 See Neil MacDonald, Kosovo says it is able to join IMF, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (May 6, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8651fd90-39d5-11de-b82d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qQ8obveS (“Some 
countries that refuse to accept Kosovo as a state backed its IMF membership, including Greece, one of 
five European Union member states refusing to dismiss Serbian sovereignty claims.”). 
118 See Spain exposes EU split as US leads recognition, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2008), http://  
www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/19/kosovo.serbia (“The EU statement said the Kosovo 
breakaway was unique, due to the wars in the 1990s that tore Yugoslavia into seven different 
countries.”). 
119 See supra note 84. 
120 UN membership door closed for Kosovo—Russia, TV-NOVOSTI, http://rt.com/politics/churkin-
kosovo-un-resolution/. 
121 U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 2. 
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of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World 
Customs Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and others. 
Coordinated efforts from all of Kosovo’s institutions, including Parliament, can 
make this process a success. 
b. The Development of Parliamentary Diplomacy 
Parliamentary diplomacy is a new concept that is rapidly expanding 
throughout parliamentary assemblies of western democracies.122 Parliaments have 
played this role in the past in a different context and format. The separation-of-
powers paradigm in many democratic countries has made the role of the parliament 
in the formulation of foreign policy a difficult one to define, as the executive 
branch is most often charged with taking the lead role in foreign policy. 
In Kosovo, Parliament has expanded its engagement in the area of foreign 
affairs over the last few years. In the first years after independence, Parliament 
struggled to define its role because the Constitution provides that the President of 
the Republic is the head of state and the organ of foreign policy.123 However, the 
Constitution also provides that the Government, through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, deals with foreign policy.124 This conflict in scope of power became a 
source of disagreement between the President and the Government, especially 
because these two institutions were run by different political parties after the 
declaration. While these two institutions learned to coordinate their efforts, 
Parliament became heavily involved in many foreign policy initiatives. Frequently, 
Parliament discusses issues of foreign policy in its Committees and during plenary 
sessions, particularly for topics that related to the dialogue with Serbia. 
Parliament has played a significant role in foreign policy by exercising its 
power to ratify international agreements. The Constitution requires international 
treaties and membership in international organizations to be ratified by a 2/3 
majority in the Parliament.125 Parliamentary oversight of foreign affairs is also 
increasing through its development of bilateral relations with other parliaments. 
There are a number of countries that hesitate to host high level officials from 
                                                          
 
122 George Noulas, The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy in Foreign Policy, FOREIGN POL. J. (Oct. 22, 
2011), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/22/the-role-of-parliamentary-diplomacy-in-
foreign-policy/. 
123 Article 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 
124 Id. at art. 93(1). 
125 Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 
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Kosovo, but that may invite parliamentary delegations. The parliaments of many 
non-recognizing countries have hosted parliamentary delegations from Kosovo, 
and have even made statements in favor of Kosovo’s independence, despite the fact 
that their executive branches have not recognized Kosovo’s independence.126 This 
willingness to treat with parliamentary delegations has also been the case with 
parliamentary assemblies of international organizations and institutions. 
Parliamentary delegations from Kosovo have been invited to, and have participated 
in the work of, parliamentary assemblies at the EU Parliament, the Council of 
Europe, and NATO. Given the fact that Kosovo has yet to join these prominent 
international organizations, its presence at many of these forums has been rooted in 
the goodwill of the hosting or organizing party. So far, Kosovo has not been able to 
use the potential influence of its Parliament in the legislative output of these forums 
in support of its legitimate interests. 
Foreign policy, by terms of the Constitution, is exercised by the Executive 
branch. However, there is a growing need for Kosovo’s Parliament to increase the 
role of both bilateral and multilateral parliamentary diplomacy through active 
engagement with parliamentary members of regional countries and beyond. The 
positive and modest role played by the Parliament of Kosovo on foreign policy is 
because political forces present in the Parliament have agreed on most foreign 
policy issues. Kosovo’s Parliament has also shown its interest in diplomacy 
through parliamentary control, frequent meetings of committees, and by enhancing 
the involvement of parliamentarians in foreign affairs. 
3. The Future of Parliamentary Diplomacy 
September 7, 2012 marked the end of supervised independence and the start 
of a new era in Kosovo. The temporary supervision of independence was a process 
foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan, which was to end after Kosovo implemented all the 
obligations foreseen in that settlement proposal. A process of constitutional and 
legislative amendments was necessary for the end of supervised independence, and 
the institution that led and concluded this process was Parliament. With enormous 
challenges ahead in the long path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, it is crucial 
that parliamentary diplomacy develops further, with a particular focus on 
parliamentary oversight of foreign affairs. 
                                                          
 
126 One such example occurred shortly after the conference. See Zeidan meets parliamentary delegation 
from Kosovo, LIBYA HERALD (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/18/zeidan-meets-
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PART III—THE ECONOMY, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND 
EDUCATION 
G. Trade and Investment in Kosovo: Opportunities and 
Challenges 
Katerina Ossenova* 
There has been endless political discourse about the legality of Kosovo’s 
2008 declaration of independence, the recognition of Kosovo by nations around the 
world, the fragility and continuing tension in northern Kosovo, and the stalled 
progress with Serbia. While many political and territorial questions remain 
unanswered four years after independence, Kosovo needs to shift its focus to 
economic growth and development. Kosovo’s future depends on its ability to 
continue on a path toward economic growth and sustainability, including regional 
and European economic integration. 
1. Opportunities for Trade and Investment in Kosovo 
a. Recent Economic Developments 
Despite a global recession, Kosovo’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
steadily increased since 2007, experiencing a 5.3% growth in 2011.127 Despite a 
decrease in 2009, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also experienced steady growth, 
with an 8% increase in 2011.128 Foreign investment has largely been devoted to 
Kosovo’s construction, production, financial services, and real estate sectors.129 
Kosovo’s trade with the United States has been modest: in 2011, U.S. exports to 
Kosovo totaled just over $15 million; imports from Kosovo amounted to less than 
$1 million.130 In 2011, U.S. FDI into Kosovo was almost $19 million. 
The Government of Kosovo, led by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, has 
developed a comprehensive strategy to increase FDI and create sustainable 
                                                          
 
* Attorney Advisor International, Commercial Law Development Program, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
127 Europe: Kosovo, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Investing in Kosovo, INV. PROMOTION AGENCY OF KOSOVO, 19 (May 
2011), http://www.invest-ks.org/documents/brochure/Investors%20Guide%202011.pdf. 
128 Investing in Kosovo, supra note 127, at 17. 
129 Id. at 18. 
130 Trade in Goods with Kosovo, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c4803.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
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economic development. Kosovo has defined the sectors that present the best 
investment opportunities: business process outsourcing, mining and energy, wood 
and metal processing, agribusiness, textiles, decorative stone, tourism, construction, 
automotive components, and electronic components.131 
b. Making the Case for Investing in Kosovo 
There are many reasons why foreign companies should consider investing in 
Kosovo. Its liberal trade regime includes membership in the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and its autonomous trade preferences with the 
European Union provide duty free access to the EU market.132 Kosovo is eligible 
for both the US and EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Programs, 
giving it preferential duty-free entry for up to 5,000 products. Kosovo’s strategic 
location—bordering Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—gives it an 
opportunity to become a regional hub with easy access to the rest of Europe. 
Kosovo has streamlined and simplified its corporate and income tax system in an 
effort to attract investment. There is a flat corporate tax rate of 10%, a progressive 
income tax rate ranging from 0-10%, and VAT is capped at 16%. 
With a population of 1.8 million, Kosovo boasts Europe’s youngest 
population, with an average age of 27.133 There are a number of public and private 
universities, with 15,000 new graduates every year.134 English and German are 
widely spoken and many graduates spend a semester or year studying in Europe or 
the United States. The average monthly wage, at approximately 300 euros a month, 
is significantly less than its European neighbors. 
Kosovo’s business friendly reforms include the Law on Foreign Investments, 
which requires equal treatment for foreign and domestic investors. The Bilateral 
Agreements on Investment Protection and Promotion provide for free transfer of 
funds, repatriation of profits and dividends, protection against retroactive 
application of laws, and protection against expropriation. Kosovo became a 
member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 2009, and most 
recently, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in November 
                                                          
 
131 Investing in Kosovo, supra note 127, at 7. 
132 Kosovo Country Report, BTI-PROJECT, 18 (2012), http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/ 
reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Kosovo.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo Country Report]. 
133 Europe: Kosovo, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
134 Investing in Kosovo, supra note 127, at 26. 
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2012—all significant steps in the integration of Kosovo into international 
organizations.135 In September 2012, Kosovo started negotiations with Turkey for 
its first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and made plans to start FTA negotiations 
with the EU and other nations in 2013.136 
Kosovo was recently ranked 98th in the 2013 World Bank Doing Business 
Report (up from 126th in 2012).137 The two biggest improvements in the report 
were “starting a business” and “protecting investors,”—areas where Kosovo has 
undertaken reforms in recent years. The business registration process has been 
significantly streamlined, administrative procedures for exports and imports have 
been reduced, and many required licenses were reduced or eliminated.138 
2. Trade and Investment Challenges in Kosovo 
The institutional and structural challenges that remain in Kosovo will impede 
meaningful and sustained economic development until they are overcome or 
addressed. 
a. Public Perception 
The challenge of public perception is a difficult one to define, explain, or 
quantify. Extensive media coverage of Kosovo’s fight for independence, its 
uncertain status throughout Yugoslavia’s history, the conflict with Serbia in the 
1990’s, and its administration by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
from 1999 until 2008 has educated the world about the plight of Kosovo and what 
it has endured on its path to independence. These events have also created a public 
perception that Kosovo is a risky, underdeveloped, post-conflict nation too unstable 
for trade and investment. There is an overwhelming perception that Kosovo’s 
public administration is inefficient, that business regulations are complex, that 
                                                          
 
135 World Bank, Kosovo Joins World Bank Grp. Insts. (June 29, 2009), http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22230081~menuPK:258604~pagePK:
2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:258599,00.html; Kosovo Becomes the International Monetary 
Fund’s 186th Member, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 29, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/sec/pr/2009/pr09240.htm; Kosovo To Become Member of the EBDR, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 16 2012), http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/ 
2012/121116a.shtml. 
136 Kosova: Discussions on Free Trade Agreement With Turkey, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND 
PEOPLES ORG. (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.unpo.org/article/14911. 
137 Ease of Doing Bus. in Kosovo, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ 
exploreeconomies/kosovo (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
138 Investing in Kosovo, supra note 127, at 7. 
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corruption is tolerated and prevalent, and that companies are unable to resolve 
contract disputes in court in a fair and efficient manner. 
Kosovo must create public awareness about itself as a nation and formulate a 
comprehensive and aggressive trade and investment strategy. It must actively 
engage with the international business community, participate in global and 
national conferences, trade fairs, and symposia, and engage in a wide-reaching 
public relations campaign focused on the cultural, economic, and people-oriented 
facets of Kosovo. 
b. International Recognition 
Kosovo’s relationship with foreign countries will inevitably affect business 
and investment prospects. Eliminating trade and investment possibilities with 
countries that have not recognized Kosovo, or with countries that support Serbia’s 
unwillingness to recognize Kosovo, drastically narrows the field for possible 
investment opportunities. 
Continuing conflicts over independence and territorial sovereignty have a 
negative impact on trade and transportation, especially with Serbia’s strategic 
location as a gateway to the rest of Europe. While Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo 
may not be realistic, negotiating for the free flow of goods and services between 
the two countries should be a priority. 
c. Rule of Law 
One of the most fundamental and essential challenges in Kosovo remains the 
rule of law. Economic stability and development is closely linked to the rule of law 
and a transparent, fair, and efficient government. Kosovo continues to struggle with 
creating such government institutions and justice systems. High level corruption is 
common, with only a few implicated officials properly prosecuted.139 A 
Transparency International report revealed that between 13% and 22% of those 
surveyed admitted to bribing a public official in 2009; 38% of those surveyed 
believe that the judiciary is the most corrupt institution in Kosovo.140 Kosovo does 
                                                          
 
139 Kosovo Country Report, supra note 132, at 18. 
140 David L. Phillips, The Balkans’ Underbelly, WORLD POLICY INST., 93 (2012), http://hrcolumbia.org/ 
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not have truly independent police, prosecutors, and judges who are immune to 
political pressure.141 
Kosovo needs high level political will to ensure that the rule of law becomes 
fundamental; such support is critical in order for Kosovo’s citizens to embrace the 
notion.142 By emphasizing the importance of the rule of law, Kosovo will be able to 
create public awareness and confidence, increasing the demand and respect for 
justice. The rule of law can only permeate in society through an informed, 
involved, and empowered public. 
d. Dependence on the International Community and 
Diaspora 
Kosovo’s continued dependence on international aid and its large and 
supportive diaspora cannot be a foundation for a sustainable economy. Remittances 
from the diaspora account for about 11%–16% of Kosovo’s GDP. Donor-financed 
activities and aid account for another 15% of GDP.143 Approximately 25% of 
households receive remittances, which are used for necessities. Remittances are 
now the third largest source of income for Kosovo households, behind work 
earnings and government transfers.144 
Kosovo remains the poorest country in the region, with 45% of the population 
living below the poverty line and 15% in extreme poverty.145 While donor aid will 
inevitably decline over time, dependence on remittances is something Kosovo can 
begin to address. For example, the government can create incentives to direct 
remittances to productive entrepreneurial activities, thereby encouraging their use 
for investment rather than consumption. 
                                                          
 
141 Snapshot of the Kosovo Country Profile, BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (Feb. 2012), http:// 
www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/kosovo/snapshot/. 
142 Kosovo is Lagging Behind in the Fight Against Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Oct. 13, 2012), 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121018_kosovo_is_lagging_behind_in_the_fight_aga
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143 Kosovo Remittance Study 2012, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, 20 (July 2012), 
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/KRS2012_English_858929.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo 
Remittance Study 2012]; Kosovo Country Fiduciary Assessment, THE WORLD BANK, 7 (Mar. 2012), 
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144 Kosovo Remittance Study 2012, supra note 143, at 21. 
145 Kosovo Country Report, supra note 132, at 18. 
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e. Regional Competition 
There is a plethora of regional competition that detracts from potential trade 
and investments opportunities for Kosovo. Much of what makes Kosovo attractive 
for investment can be found to a larger degree in other Southeast European nations. 
Kosovo must develop strategies for surpassing its neighbors and developing an 
economy and infrastructure that will withstand strong regional competition. 
f. Infrastructural Challenges 
Kosovo’s underdeveloped infrastructure will increase the cost of doing 
business, limit and discourage businesses from operating in Kosovo, and hinder 
larger economic growth efforts. There are frequent power outages and electricity is 
limited and unreliable.146 Roads, railways, and airports are damaged from the war 
and are implicated in complex territorial challenges. Countries that do not 
recognize Kosovo do not recognize Kosovo’s customs stamps and/or bar Kosovo 
registered trucks. These impediments present daunting challenges in developing 
new enterprises and attracting foreign investment. 
g. Expanding Beyond Services 
Kosovo’s current economy is too dependent on services. It needs to develop 
its unexploited natural resources and new value-added exports. Services account 
for over 60% of GDP and can be attributed to the large remittance inflows and 
international presence in Kosovo. In 2010, Kosovo imported $3 billion in goods 
and services and exported only $400 million.147 The economy is largely driven by 
government and small-scale retail businesses. There is a lack of viable and 
productive domestic industries or manufacturing capabilities. 
Kosovo has one of the lowest export/import rates in the region. There is 
minimal productive investment in the tradable goods sector and exports are mostly 
raw materials and unprocessed goods, with very little value added. The largest 
export is scrap metals, comprising 64.5% of total exports.148 
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Kosovo also needs investment to exploit its natural resources. Kosovo’s 
natural resources, which include lignite, lead, zinc, ferronickel, magnesium, and 
ore, present an opportunity to generate revenue, create jobs, and help mitigate 
energy shortages. While equipment, technologies, and processes for exploiting 
these resources are in need of FDI, they represent an opportunity for Kosovo’s 
economic development strategy. 
h. Increased and Streamlined Trade Facilitation 
While Kosovo has undertaken reforms to promote trade facilitation, additional 
reforms are needed to streamline business registration, licensing procedures, and 
ensure a better business enabling environment. Complicated and costly procedures 
hinder entrepreneurs and encourage an informal culture where professional 
business practices are undermined. Kosovo needs to continue to implement reforms 
that focus on protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
enforcements of contracts, anti-corruption, and protection of property. 
i. Improved Public Procurement and Privatization 
Systems 
Public procurement and privatization in Kosovo are under intense public 
scrutiny. While the Public Procurement Law (PPL) is largely aligned with EU 
Procurement Directives and in compliance with international norms and standards, 
additional improvements are needed to ensure a transparent and efficient public 
procurement system that abides by the PPL.149 Kosovo’s procurement system at 
times disregards enforcement of the PPL, requires additional procurement and 
contract management training, needs a stringent performance evaluation system for 
procurement officers, and needs to establish a clear and transparent appeals 
process.150 With several high profile public procurement corruption cases, the 
public inside and outside of Kosovo doubts the integrity and transparency of the 
public procurement system. In order for companies to feel as though they are being 
treated equally and fairly, Kosovo’s public procurement system needs to be open 
and transparent, and accusations of a corrupt system need to be addressed and 
resolved. 
Privatization in Kosovo suffers from a similar negative public perception and 
allegations of corruption and bribery. It has been blamed for stalled economic 
development in Kosovo and for undermining a large number of successful state-
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owned enterprises. Privatization in Kosovo needs to be carried out in a fair, 
transparent, and efficient manner. 
j. Judicial Capacity in International Commercial 
Disputes  
A lack of confidence in the judiciary is a concern for any foreign business 
evaluating whether to invest in Kosovo. Kosovo’s judiciary faces structural 
weaknesses and lacks essential capacities to adjudicate international commercial 
disputes. There is an insufficient number of judges and a large backlog of cases.151 
The new Law on Courts revised the court system and called for the appointment of 
new judges, but many of them lack the capacity and experience to adjudicate 
complex commercial disputes. The judiciary is also perceived to be under political 
influence and is mistrusted and viewed with cynicism by the public. Additional 
capacity building and training is needed in order to create a cadre of judges who 
can provide fair, efficient, and consistent adjudication of international commercial 
disputes. 
3. Observations 
While there have been positive economic developments and reforms in 
Kosovo, much must be done to ensure economic sustainability and regional and 
European economic integration. The government and private sector need to focus 
on developing and implementing a comprehensive economic growth strategy that 
tackles the abovementioned challenges. The importance of developing a sustainable 
and competitive economy cannot be compromised or undermined. 
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H. Privatization and Sustainable Long Term Economic 
Development 
Arben Limani, Naim Avdiu, and Mrika Tahiri* 
1. UNMIK and Socially Owned Enterprises 
One of the most important agencies in the economic development of Kosovo 
is the Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK or the Agency). The Agency holds 
responsibility for the privatization of the economy in a manner that promotes 
sustainable long-term economic development. 
Public perception has been that the Agency should be more active in the 
strategic planning of economic development. However, as an administrative public 
body with no political role and with limited resources, the Agency depends largely 
on other stakeholders who are obliged under Kosovo law to establish the path for 
long-term, sustainable economic development. 
Socially-owned enterprises (SOEs) were widely used in the former Yugoslav 
economy. Social property was meant to be its own legal category separate from 
private and state property. The primary feature of social property was that society 
was the title-holder; no individual was entitled to acquire an ownership interest. 
Former SOEs were characterized by the need to fulfill a social need, which resulted 
in over-employment, decreased productivity, increased costs, run-down 
development, illiquidity, and decreased investment. SOEs in Kosovo experienced 
mass employee lay-offs and lost marketability after the fall of Yugoslavia in the 
90’s. 
Privatization began with UNMIK in 1999. The Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) determined, through UNMIK’s first legislative act on 
July 25, 1999, that it would administer the state property of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, or the Republic of Serbia, in Kosovo. SOEs were added to state 
property in a later amendment to this Regulation. 
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 
provided that certain powers would not be granted to the Provisional Institutions of 
Kosovo, but would remain exclusively with the SRSG. Among these powers were 
the authority to administer public, state, and socially owned property; the 
regulation of public and socially owned enterprises; and the definition of the 
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jurisdiction and competence for the resolution of commercial property disputes. 
UNMIK functioned through four “pillars.” Pillar IV was managed by the European 
Union and was tasked with economic reconstruction and development. 
The legal framework in force during the UNMIK administration was not in 
line with the new Constitution. The need for legal change in the privatization 
process was immediate. Upon the Declaration of Independence, laws were 
promulgated to replace relevant UNMIK Regulations. Existing laws were amended 
to reflect the new political structure in Kosovo. 
2. The Replacement of UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 by the 
Law on the Privatization Agency of Kosovo 
The Law on the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, No. 03/L-067 replaced 
UNMIK Regulation 2002/12. As a result, the Privatization Agency of Kosovo was 
established to replace the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), which had managed and 
privatized Kosovo’s SOEs. This change included a new law, which limited the 
scope of the Agency to SOEs. Administration of POEs was regulated by the new 
Law on POEs No. 03/L-087, and subsequently was amended with the Law No. 
04/L-111. After the ICJ Opinion on Kosovo’s independence, it was subsequently 
replaced with the Law on the Privatization Agency of Kosovo No. 04/L034, which 
gave a new shape to the process of liquidation. The main goal was to accelerate the 
liquidation process of SOEs through organizational restructuring, and the removal 
of redundant steps and excessive backlogs. 
Another positive change was the adoption of the new policies that enabled the 
interim distribution of 20% of the proceeds to eligible employees. The PAK 
adopted this change with the view of distributing proceeds in a more rational 
timeframe. The efficient distribution of these proceeds has had a direct effect on the 
individual economies of the ex-employees, as well as in easing social 
dissatisfaction. 
The new law also changed the composition of the Board of Directors of PAK. 
It stipulates that three members must be international and appointed by the 
International Civilian Representative in Kosovo. The other five directors are non-
political, nationals of Kosovo appointed by the Assembly of Kosovo. The 
Assembly also designates a national of Kosovo to serve as Chairman of the Board. 
These changes enable privatization to be in the hands of locals, while maintaining 
some form of international supervision. 
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3. Replacement of UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 as 
amended by 2008/4 on the Special Chamber of the 
Supreme Court 
UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 was amended on January 1, 2012 to establish the 
Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo (SCSC), with a mandate to 
address all matters related to the Kosovo Trust Agency. According to the Special 
Chamber, the KTA is the only entity authorized to present cases related to SOE 
privatization in front of this court. This stance disregarded potential adverse legal 
and economic consequences for Kosovo. It was justified by a legal opinion issued 
by UNMIK in 2009, which determined the applicable law regarding privatization. 
UNMIK explained that Regulation 2002/12 on KTA is the only applicable 
law; not the law that regulates SOE privatization. This opinion was justified by the 
Kosovo Assembly, which issued a statement that its laws cannot supersede an 
UNMIK Regulation. As a result, the Special Chamber considered the law on the 
Privatization Agency as an internal regulation of the Agency. Thus, PAK was 
recognized as an “interested party” in the procedure in the front of SCSC. This 
resulted in an odd situation when cases were tried in this court. A UNMIK legal 
representative would appear in court, with almost no knowledge about the 
particular case. On the other side was a PAK legal representative, with full access 
to the history and documents of the case, but with limited procedural capacity. This 
situation has caused delays in the privatization process, as well as a rollover effect 
in most segments of privatization, with an emphasis on the distribution of 20% for 
employees and timely defining of the rights and obligations of the parties asserting 
rights before this court. 
It is not clear why UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 was not replaced by the 
Kosovo legislation. When it became clear that this situation is harmful to the 
privatization process, Law on the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court on 
Matters Related to PAK, Nr. 04/L-033 was promulgated and entered into force on 
the January 1, 2012. Nonetheless, the Special Chamber has been an obstacle to 
finalizing the 20% distribution. Since 2008, the court has only approved one final 
list of eligible employees out of hundreds pending before the court. 
4. Commercialization and Special Spin Offs as a 
projection of long term sustainable economic 
development 
In 2000, UNMIK published its “Enterprise Development Strategy” as a White 
Paper. This document was not formally adopted, but was considered the basis for 
putting SOE assets into economic use. The first such activity undertaken by 
UNMIK and the Department for Trade and Industry was commercialization of 
SOEs. Commercialization consists of a long-term lease of an SOE to an investor 
under specific conditions. The lessee is responsible for lease payments, as well as 
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making certain investments and maintaining a designated number of the SOE 
employees. The lessee usually obtains the right of first refusal if the Agency 
decides to privatize the SOE. 
In certain cases, SOE investors were also entitled to count the depreciated 
value of their investment toward the purchase price. From a long-term sustainable 
economic development standpoint, commercialization is viewed as successful in 
some cases, but also devastating to some SOEs. Some commercialized SOEs have 
become very successful businesses, even after full privatization. Other SOEs have 
become virtually nonexistent. Failure has usually been a result of investor non-
compliance with the commercialization contract. This non-compliance has 
occurred, in part, because the only sanction foreseen was the termination of the 
contract, which has never been utilized, largely because of a lack of monitoring of 
these arrangements. Monitoring and sanctions have only occurred after the Agency 
was turned over to Kosovo authorities. 
Special spin-off privatization was slightly different for the commercialization 
process. This process was more of an ownership transfer that took place under 
certain investment and employment conditions, with the possibility of purchasing 
back shares of the enterprise in cases of egregious breach. The commitment 
agreements have usually provided an obligation for the buyer to invest a certain 
amount of money and retain a certain number of employees for a period of two 
years. This model is intended to be used for larger, more important SOEs, in order 
to preserve certain industries. There were 25 SOEs privatized through the special 
spin-off method, and most of them have been successful in reaching the investment 
and employment goals required by the contract. Special spin-offs have played a 
role in preserving important industries in Kosovo. 
5. Legal Reforms and Privatization 
Legal reforms have had diverse effects on the privatization process in 
Kosovo. While these reforms have removed redundant steps and shortened 
otherwise burdensome timelines, the reforms have had little or no effect on some 
aspects of the privatization process. Greater efficiencies have been gained in 
monitoring of the conditional sales resulting from Special Spin Off and conditional 
privatizations. The process of privatization and liquidation sales has also been 
accelerated, enabling the distribution of 20% for the eligible SOE employees and 
the creation of the basis for initiation and timely execution of the liquidation of the 
SOEs. Little or no effect was felt in the efficiency of the Special Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Kosovo which is a crucial stakeholder in this process. 
Unfortunately, legal reforms have not increased cooperation and coordination 
among ministries, municipalities, and cadastral authorities. 
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I. Reform in the Judicial Branch in Kosovo 
The Honorable John Tunheim* 
To fully assess the workings of a judicial system, one needs an extensive 
checklist with many indicators of an effective judiciary. I will focus on a number of 
critical areas that serve as indicators for determining the effectiveness of the 
Judicial Branch in Kosovo. 
1. Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts 
When the United Nations took over administrative control of Kosovo, it 
reinstated the old familiar Yugoslav legal system. This system is confusing, highly 
duplicative, and inefficient. It has thus facilitated a serious case backlog and has 
hurt the credibility of the judiciary. 
In July 2010, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a new Law on Courts, which is 
modern and well-structured. It reforms the court system into a first instance (trial 
level) Basic Court in many of Kosovo’s municipalities; it creates a national Court 
of Appeals in Pristina, with a guaranteed right of appeal in all cases; and it reforms 
the Supreme Court. This law will become fully effective in January 2012 and, in 
my view, is the most important improvement in the history of judicial systems in 
Kosovo. 
2. Judicial Independence through Governance 
An independent Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC), with responsibility for 
overseeing the judiciary, was enshrined in the Constitution. The KJC is critiqued in 
Europe for not including enough judges elected by their peers, but there are a 
majority of judges on the Council who are overseeing the transition to the new 
organization of the courts.  
3. Appointment and Tenure of Judges 
The UN appointed judges for a fixed term due to its own transitional status. 
This was problematic because a lengthy term of office is critical to exercising 
sufficient independence in a modern judiciary. In 2010, the KJC went through a 
vetting process (with significant international participation) to decide which of the 
sitting UN judges would be re-appointed. Many judges failed the test, while others 
were given life terms until mandatory retirement. Removal is very limited and must 
                                                          
 
* Federal District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 
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be administered by the KJC. This process has established the judicial tenure that is 
a necessary ingredient for judicial independence. 
One concern is that new judges will receive a three-year probationary term 
before receiving life tenure. This was a concession to secure lifetime tenure. The 
method for evaluating new judges has yet to be determined. 
4. Judicial Salaries 
Until January 2011, judges in Kosovo were not being paid a salary that 
ensured independence of judgment and competence of decision-making. Most 
judges received a salary of a little over 500 euros a month. This made them 
susceptible to a host of improper influences, and encouraged some to take second 
jobs. In January 2011, salaries were improved. These improvements are not 
substantial—a Supreme Court judge makes 1271 euros a month—but they are now 
in line with salaries in the executive branch. 
5. Court Security 
A critical aspect to judicial independence is security. In Kosovo, it is said that 
there have been many threats made to judges that have influenced decision-making. 
It is difficult to document these troubling events, but given the country’s historical 
and societal makeup, security is a real issue. The new Law on the Courts has 
established a right to judicial security. At this point, administration of this right is 
not clear, but it must be. Security is essential and must be placed on the front-
burner. 
6. International Judges 
When the UN assumed control of Kosovo, there was a significant proposal to 
create a War and Ethnic Crimes Court to handle the most significant and serious 
cases in Kosovo, including war crimes. The United States opposed the creation, 
and the alternative that was implemented was to bring in international judges to 
handle tough cases. In 2001, this was a necessary measure. Kosovo judges were not 
ready to handle these cases and undue influence was rampant. 
When the UN left in 2008, the UNMIK judges were replaced by judges 
appointed by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). 
EULEX judges are on one-year contracts. They have a right to handle serious 
cases, particularly politically sensitive cases. 
The appointment of EULEX judges was meant to be a transitional measure. 
However, I have seen little evidence of transition. In my opinion, the international 
judge program needs to stop soon. The EULEX program has the effect of keeping 
the Kosovo judiciary in a permanent second-class status and sends a message to 
everyone that Kosovo judges are not competent to handle difficult cases. While 
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Kosovo’s judges may not be able to handle these cases at first, they will be able to 
with security enhancements, independence, and adequate training. 
7. Effective Training and Continuation of Old Habits 
Effective training of judges is essential for an effective judiciary based on the 
rule of law. This is especially true in a new democracy that is constantly updating 
and changing its laws. The Judicial Training Centre in Kosovo has been in place 
since 2000. While it is a well-organized center, I am not sure its work has resulted 
in well-trained modern judges. Many of Kosovo’s judges were working in the 
1980’s under the old system. Over the last decade, they have operated under the 
UN system, which re-constituted the Yugoslav system. Applicable law was unclear 
and confusing at first, and facilities are substandard. 
Kosovo’s courts today are rightly criticized for adherence to old, poor habits. 
These criticisms include holding trials in their offices, poor coordination with 
prosecutors and advocates, and a lack of transparency. Often times, a proper record 
of proceedings is not created. These failures are a matter of proper judicial training 
and require significant attention in Kosovo. 
8. Court Administration 
In early 2011, the backlog in Kosovo’s courts exceeded 120,000 cases. In 
earlier years, computers were not being used and clerks were entering cases and 
matters into large books. USAID, in particular, has devoted considerable resources 
to effective court administration. In 2004, we helped develop a case weighting 
system to better measure judges’ workloads. These things have improved today, 
but this improvement needs to remain consistent. 
9. Human Rights Issues 
The courts must be the ultimate protector of human rights. With Kosovo’s 
history, the protection of human rights has been a primary goal throughout the past 
thirteen years. To address this issue, the Kosovo Constitutional Court was given the 
authority to hear any case involving human rights claims after having exhausted the 
regular court system. Although there have been few cases thus far, I am hopeful 
that the Court, along with the other protections built in for minorities in the 
Constitution, will ensure that all people are treated well by the legal system. 
10. Courts in the North 
The courts in Mitrovica and in the north of Kosovo are not fully operational. 
In fact, it can be said that they are barely functioning. This dysfunction is no fault 
of the judiciary, but rather it is part of a much more serious problem. However, this 
dysfunction reflects poorly on the judiciary as a whole when Kosovo’s laws cannot 
operate in a part of its territory. I am hopeful that negotiations can improve this 
intolerable situation. 
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11. Kosovo Constitutional Court 
I have worked closely with the Constitutional Court in developing its 
procedures and jurisprudence. The Court has, for the most part, been very 
professional and independent and represents a very bright spot in Kosovo’s legal 
system. It has demonstrated what a professional court can do for a country—curb 
the excesses of the majority and instill the rule of law. 
12. Public Perception 
It is not easy to measure public opinion concerning the courts, but I think I 
can say with some degree of certainty that the public perception of Kosovo’s 
judiciary is not strong. The lengthy backlog undoubtedly contributes to this 
perception, as does an often wildly inaccurate news media. The new organization 
of the courts will help, as will a renewed emphasis on public service and customer 
satisfaction. A solid public relations campaign, which includes advertising and 
brochures that explain court procedures, will also help. Ultimately, what is 
necessary is an improvement in the performance of all aspects of the judiciary, with 
achievable goals in timing and resolving cases, and more transparency. 
13. Final Thoughts 
Overall, I give Kosovo’s judiciary a passing grade, but just barely; more work 
needs to be done. The international community must remember that the 
development of the rule of law is often the result of millions of baby steps as 
opposed to one giant leap. It is a marathon, not a sprint. 
K O S O V O  A F T E R  T H E  I C J  O P I N I O N   
 
P A G E  |  6 4 7   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
J. Criminal Code Changes in the Consolidation of Kosovo’s 
Statehood 
Bajram Ukaj* 
1. The Impetus for Change to the Criminal Code of 
Kosovo 
Any functioning democratic state must be built on the rule of law, and the rule 
of law in today’s world must include an effective system of criminal law. In this 
regard, Kosovo has taken steps to provide for the necessary foundation in its 
Criminal Code. 
The previous Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo was approved by the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on July 6, 2003 and entered into force on 
April 6, 2004.152 However, this version of the Criminal Code was plagued by gaps, 
inadequate criminal policies, and difficulty in its implementation. These problems 
led courts, prosecutors, and other attorneys to submit proposals for changes and 
revisions. 
These practical concerns were not the only shortcomings of the previous 
Criminal Code. Because the previous Criminal Code was drafted prior to the 
Constitution of Kosovo, the previous Code failed to fully integrate the 
Constitution’s goals of promoting human rights and international law principles. 
Those inadequacies of the previous Code also acted as an impediment to fuller 
integration within the European Community, and hopefully eventually the EU. 
Therefore, it was evident that drafting a new Criminal Code was necessary to 
strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo, to promote harmony with the Constitution of 
Kosovo, and to insure compliance with the standards of the EU. 
The Ministry of Justice for the Republic of Kosovo established a commission 
to assist in the drafting of a new Criminal Code. This commission was composed of 
members of the government (including judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and professors 
of criminal law), and of the private sector, in addition to representatives from the 
United States Embassy, USAID, and European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX). In drafting, the commission made every effort for the new 
Criminal Code to be in compliance with EU legislation and UN principles. To aid 
                                                          
 
* The author is Professor of Criminal Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Pristina, 
Republic of Kosovo. 
152 Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 2003/25, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2003/25 
(July 6, 2003). 
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in this goal, the commission considered contemporary criminal codes of democratic 
countries such as Germany, France, the United States, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Albania, as well as international instruments. 
The commission forwarded its draft to the Ministry of Justice, and then to the 
Government. The Government, through its Decision No. 01/41 of October 10, 
2011, adopted the Draft Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo.153 The 
Government certified that the Draft Code complied with EU legislation.154 The 
Draft Code was processed for review and approval by the Assembly of the 
Republic of Kosovo. The Assembly adopted the Draft Code as the new Criminal 
Code on June 22, 2012.155 The Criminal Code was published in the Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Kosovo and will enter into force on January 1, 2013.156 
The new Criminal Code consists of two parts: the General Part and the 
Special Part. The General Part consists of 13 chapters and 118 articles. In these 
chapters, the Code lays out both the provisions for determining criminal liability 
and the principles for determining criminal sanctions. Those chapters addressing 
criminal sanctions also incorporate goals of both deterrence and education. The 
Special Part consists of 22 chapters and 326 articles, where it defines specific 
criminal offenses. 
These chapters contain many changes and additions, all of which help to 
strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo. But, in the context of the path ahead for 
Kosovo following the ICJ Opinion, it is essential to highlight those changes which 
help to move Kosovo toward compliance and integration with the European 
Community and EU. 
2. Major Changes to the General Part  
The majority of changes to the general part adjusted the permitted level of 
criminal sanctions (both imprisonment and fines).157 Additionally, the General Part 
                                                          
 
153 Government Decision on the Draft Criminal Code, Oct. 10, 2011, Decision No. 01/41 (Kos.). 
154 Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of European Integration, Statement of Compliance with the European 
Union Legislation (Oct. 19, 2011). 
155 Meeting of Government of Republic of Kosovo held, THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,2954. 
156 Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No. 19 (July 13, 2012), available at http://gazetazyrtare 
.rks-gov.net/Documents/GZK-Nr.%2019-2012%20(anglisht).pdf. 
157 See, e.g., Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, ch. III, arts. 45–46 and ch. VI, art. 94. 
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of the new Criminal Code incorporated some definitions essential for the 
understanding of the Code as a whole.158 However, other changes reflect a shift 
toward standardizing criminal law with the rest of Europe. Among the major 
changes to the General Part of the new Criminal Code include: 
• Chapter I enumerates that criminal sanctions must be determined by 
balancing the rights of Kosovo for justice and self-preservation with the 
individual’s rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.159 
• Chapter I now requires a strict adherence to the legal principle: nullum 
crimen sine lege; nulla poeana sine lege.160 
• Self-defense as an absolute defense to criminal behavior is now 
recognized in certain limited circumstances.161 
• Chapter II recognizes the criminal culpability of individuals who 
promote crime by participating as an accessory-before-the-fact or who 
conspire to act criminally,162 but limits liability to relative culpability.163 
• In the new Criminal Code, the purpose of punishment has been 
articulated in a more precise and detailed terms. Among the purposes 
enumerated are the deterrence of criminal behavior, rehabilitation, and 
to strengthen the rule of law.164 
• One major change which is at odds with the norms within the EU is the 
possibility of imposing life imprisonment “for the most serious criminal 
offenses committed under especially aggravating circumstances or 
criminal offenses that have caused severe consequences.”165 
                                                          
 
158 Id. at ch. VIII, art. 120. 
159 Id. at ch. I, art.1. 
160 Id. at ch. I, art. 2. 
161 Id. at ch. II, art. 14(1) (“A criminal offence committed under the influence of unbearable violence or 
unbearable threat is not a criminal offence.”). 
162 Id. at ch. II, arts. 27(2), 35(2). 
163 Id. at ch. II, art. 40(3). 
164 Id. at ch. III, art. 41(3). 
165 Id. at ch. III, art. 44(1). 
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• The new Criminal Code provides detailed rules which condition the 
aggravation or mitigation of criminal sanctions.166 
• Chapter IV provides the rules for merger of offenses in determining 
criminal sanctions.167 
• Chapter V provides new regulations on the imposition of mandatory 
psychiatric or substance abuse treatment.168 
3. Major Changes to the Special Part 
Unlike the General Part of the Criminal Code, which lays out the general 
principles of criminality and punishment, the Special Part is solely comprised of 
specifically enumerated offenses. The Special Part has seen far more revisions and 
additions than the General Part. Some of these changes are merely cosmetic;169 
others address gaps in the UNMIK Criminal Code.170 However, many crimes, and 
even whole new chapters of crimes, have been created in order to build toward 
integration with the EU. Often the behavior now proscribed relates to systematic 
issues throughout Europe. Some of the additions made to the Criminal Code with 
an eye toward integration include: 
• The Code has added chapters which criminalize acts against the state, 
including support of terrorism,171 as well as narcotics related offenses.172 
• The Code now prohibits activities which curtail rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Kosovo, such as violation of voting rights173 and labor 
rights.174 
                                                          
 
166 Id. at ch. III, art. 74. 
167 Id. at ch. IV, art. 81. 
168 Id. at ch. V, arts. 87–91. 
169 For example, Chapter XIV of the UNMIK Criminal Code were titled “Criminal Offences against 
International Law.” Those same crimes are now contained in a chapter titled “Criminal Offences against 
Humanity and Values Protected by International Law.” Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, 
Chapter XV. 
170 See, e.g., Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, ch. XXVI, art. 320 (Theft of Utility Services). 
171 Id. at ch. XIV. 
172 Id. at ch. XXIII. 
173 Id. at ch. XVIII, arts. 210–15. 
174 Id. at ch. XIX, arts. 221–25. 
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• Several additions to the Code address criminal activity which have been 
problematic across Europe, such as: human trafficking for prostitution175 
and ecological crimes.176 
• Some of the additions are related to showing with compliance with 
international agreements regarding war crimes177 or in response to 
crimes tried by EULEX prosecutors.178 
• The Code may be seeking to allay any international concerns about the 
Kosovo economic system by criminalizing a much wider range of 
“offences against the economy.”179 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, the adoption of the new Criminal Code by the Assembly of the 
Republic of Kosovo has been important not only in terms of building, 
strengthening, and implementing the rule of law and it’s an important factor in the 
protection of human rights and freedoms in Kosovo, but it also represents a 
standard for Kosovo’s possible integration into the European Union. Hence, the 
Criminal Code in its legal aspect enables implanting state-building and protecting 
the sovereignty of Kosovo. 
                                                          
 
175 Id. at ch. XX, art. 231 (criminalizing sexual acts with a trafficking victim); id., at ch. XXI, art. 254 
(criminalizing failure to report child abuse). 
176 Id. at ch. XXVI, art. 361 (criminalizing sale or removal of protected plants or animals out of 
Kosovo). 
177 Id. at ch. XXVI, art. 387 (criminalizing failure to inform on a person indicted by a international 
criminal tribunal). 
178 Id. at ch. XXI, art. 265 (punishing unlawful organ harvesting or transplantation); see also Kosovo 
medics accused of trafficking kidneys, BBC (Nov. 12, 2010, 7:21 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-11741964. 
179 Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter XXV. See also, id. at ch. XXVII, art. 337 
(criminalizing fraud related to receiving funds from European Community); id. at ch. XXXIV, art. 430 
(prohibiting giving bribes to foreign public officials). 
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K. Cooperation in Legal Education and Legal Reform 
Ronald A. Brand* 
1. A New Situation and Recurring Issues 
Discussing “Kosovo after the ICJ Opinion,” allows us to consider a situation 
that has no historical precedent: the process of fulfilling the aspirations of a 
declaration of independence that has been considered by the International Court of 
Justice. This discussion also allows us to consider issues that have been considered 
by many transition states over the past two and a half decades, as well as common 
elements faced in the process of state-building. This section focuses on one such 
common element: legal education and its role in the legal reform process. In 
particular, this section addresses the benefits of cooperation in legal education 
between the University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Pitt) and the transition State 
of Kosovo. 
The comments here draw on my writings about the export of legal education 
and the importance to U.S. law schools considering the external, international 
influences of implementing changes in the traditional structure of U.S. legal 
education180 and about how teaching methods distinguish differing legal systems 
and require cross-system consideration of pedagogical style and methodology. 
More importantly, these comments leverage my experience in the administration of 
the LL.M. Program at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law as a fulcrum for 
educating future lawyers, government officials, and law professors from both the 
United States and Kosovo in a cooperative process that has had a very real effect. 
There are lessons in that cooperation for both legal educators in the United States 
and for legal educators and government officials in Kosovo. 
2. Foundations of Cooperation—U.S. Department of State 
Funding 
In 2002, the University of Pittsburgh—in an internal partnership between the 
School of Law’s Center for International Legal Education (CILE) and the Center 
for Russian and East European Studies (REES)—and the University of Pristina 
Faculty of Law received funding from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
                                                          
 
* Professor and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law. 
180 THE EXPORT OF LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS PROMISE AND IMPACT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES (Ronald 
A. Brand & D. Wes Rist eds., 2009) [hereinafter EXPORT]. 
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Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. This partnership was part of a network of 
projects undertaken by CILE and REES in Ukraine, Serbia, and Kosovo.181 Each 
project focused on assisting a law faculty in a transition country with the issues it 
faced during the transition process. 
In Prishtina, over four years of grant-funded activities, the partnership opened 
a jointly-administered International Law Resource Center; graduated three 
outstanding Kosovar academics from the LL.M. program (with generous grants of 
tuition from Pitt’s University Center for International Studies (UCIS) and from the 
Muskie Fellowship Program); executed three summer academic programs in 
Prishtina; prepared and accompanied four teams of students and faculty coaches 
from Prishtina to Vienna for the Willem C. Vis International Arbitration Moot 
Competition (Vis Moot); and provided extensive library materials, curricular 
advice, and faculty training in Prishtina. We were able to leverage the State 
Department funds by providing support from other sources in a manner that created 
a sustainable and lasting process. 
3. Sustained Cooperation—Kosovo LL.M. Students at Pitt 
Law 
This process of cooperation continued after the termination of State 
Department funding in 2006. CILE has continued to work with REES, and with 
other parts of UCIS, to provide funding to support critical elements of 
cooperation—especially tuition and other support for Kosovar students attending 
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law’s LL.M. program. In Kosovo, the 
process of cooperation has been an organic one. Kosovars who studied in Pitt’s 
LL.M. program have returned to Kosovo and maintained the contacts and 
relationships established during their time in Pittsburgh. The result is a very strong 
network of relationships upon which additional cooperation has continued to be 
built. Additional young Kosovar lawyers have come for LL.M. degrees at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Scholars returning to Kosovo have continued sending a 
Vis Moot team to Vienna each year from the University of Prishtina, and, in 2013, 
they helped initiate the first Vis Moot team from the American University in 
Kosovo. 
Nine Kosovo lawyers have received, or are receiving, a LL.M. education from 
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in the past nine years. This 
                                                          
 
181 CILE and REES also received similar Department of State grants for cooperation with Kyiv National 
Taras Shevchenko University (Ukraine), the University of Belgrade (Serbia & Montenegro), and 
Donetsk national University (Ukraine). 
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demonstrates both the sustainability of the original program of cooperation and the 
commitment of Pitt Law and CILE to not only continue, but to strengthen the 
Pittsburgh-Prishtina relationship. These lawyers have had, and will continue to 
have, significant influence on legal practice and legal reform in Kosovo. 
4. Sustained Cooperation—Pitt Law Internships in Kosovo 
The Pittsburgh-Prishtina relationship is not a one-way street. Not long after 
the partnership was formed in 2002, Pitt J.D. students began traveling to Kosovo to 
do internships in various offices and organizations. These internships have included 
placements in Pristina at: the Center for Human Rights, the ABA-CEELI (Rule of 
Law Initiative), the Criminal Defense Resource Center, the United Nations Mission 
in Kosovo Department of Justice, Legal Office, the Assembly of Kosovo, the 
Office of the Legal Advisor to the President of Kosovo, the Foreign Affairs Office 
of Kosovo, the Kosovo Ministry of European Integration, the Kosovo Ministry of 
Justice, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in Northern 
Mitrovice. 
5. Sustained Cooperation—The Pitt Law Consortium at 
the Vis Moot 
Another aspect of the sustained cooperation has been the Pitt Law Consortium 
at the annual Vis Moot in Vienna each spring. Under the original State Department 
grants, CILE helped expand the international commercial law and arbitration 
curriculum at Donetsk National University and Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University 
in Ukraine, at the University of Belgrade in Serbia, and at the University of 
Prishtina in Kosovo. Each of those schools continues to send a team to the Vis 
Moot competition in each year, without CILE support. These teams cooperate with 
one another by arriving early and engaging in practice arguments before the formal 
competition begins. In 2012, a second Kosovar Vis Moot team was added to the 
consortium when Pitt Law graduate Vjosa Osmani, helped arrange funding and 
served as faculty adviser for the American University in Prishtina. The consortium 
has been further enhanced by CILE’s recent contracts with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) to do similar 
curricular development in the Middle East, with Vis Moot teams from Bahrain, 
Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE joining the Consortium at the beginning of 
the Moot in Vienna. In each instance, initial efforts by CILE and financial 
assistance through CLDP have turned to self-sustaining participation by each 
Middle East law school. Thus, the consortium continues to build on the model that 
exists in Kosovo. 
K O S O V O  A F T E R  T H E  I C J  O P I N I O N   
 
P A G E  |  6 5 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
6. Specific Results—Continued Pittsburgh-Prishtina 
Cooperation in Legal Education 
The lives of the nine Kosovar lawyers who have received LL.M. degrees from 
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and of the more than twenty Pitt Law 
students who have engaged in legal internships in Kosovo, are a testimony to the 
impact of legal education in a multi-system environment. While a sophisticated 
empirical study of that impact is beyond the scope of this section, the 
accomplishments of those LL.M. graduates from Kosovo are a clear indication of 
this impact on the legal system and legal education system of Kosovo. These 
graduates have affected the Office of the President and the Assembly of the 
Republic of Kosovo. Moreover, they have established new law firms, taught in 
several universities (both inside and outside of Kosovo), worked for human rights 
organizations and development projects, drafted proposed legislation, and studied 
legal system needs. 
The stories of the Pitt J.D. graduates who have interned in Kosovo reveal a 
similar impact. These individuals have become employed by the United Nations, 
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and major law 
firms and corporations. They have also performed human rights and development 
work in many countries. All of these students have been influenced by their 
Kosovo experiences. 
7. General Impact—The Export of Legal Education182 
A 2007 Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund concluded that, 
when students study outside their home countries, there is “a very strong 
correlation between the lagged average indices of democracy in host countries and 
the current level of democracy in the origin country.”183 The same study noted that 
in 2007, 46 heads of government were products of higher education in the United 
States, and that in 1990: 
Out of 115 world leaders, 66 studied abroad at a certain point; the percentage of 
foreign-education leaders’ increases to more than two-thirds if one is 
considering only developing nations. These numbers show clearly that foreign-
                                                          
 
182 This portion of the paper is taken from the author’s work in EXPORT, supra note 180. 
183 Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH 
OF KNOWLEDGE 20 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
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educated individuals do play an overwhelming role in their own home 
countries.184 
In a 2005 article in The American Lawyer titled, “They Rule the World,” Michael 
D. Goldhaber considered the importance of an LL.M. degree from a U.S. law 
school to government and business relations throughout the world. Mikhail 
Saakashvili is an example of that influence.185 Saakashvili returned to the former 
Soviet Republic of Georgia after obtaining his LL.M. degree at Columbia Law 
School to lead a democratic revolt and be elected President of a new state. Once in 
office, he appointed other U.S. LL.M. graduates to be his Foreign Minister and his 
Deputy Justice Minister. Says Goldhaber in his article: 
Lawyers like these are unstoppable when armed with another degree. Former 
LL.M.’s Giuliano Amato of Italy and Mary Robinson of Ireland rose to become 
heads of state. A third of the judges on the International Court of Justice hold 
graduate degrees from U.S. law schools. And in Taiwan, which rivals Georgia 
for LL.M. power, U.S. alumni include the vice president, the mayor of Taipei, 
and at least two grand justices.186 
According to Gocha Lordkipanidze, a foreign policy adviser to the Georgian Prime 
Minister and Harvard LL.M. graduate: 
It definitely has an impact on our careers and our lives. It’s ingrained in every 
piece of paper I’m writing or action I’m taking for the government of Georgia. 
After Harvard, I’m neither European nor American, but at peace with both ways 
of thinking.187 
This anecdotal approach indicates the importance of a U.S. legal education 
not only to its recipient, but also on the home country of the returning scholar. This 
importance is part of what should be a much larger discussion of the export of U.S. 
legal education. Few, if any, other exports can have similar impact. For those of us 
                                                          
 
184 Id. at 21. 
185 Michael D. Goldhaber, “They Rule the World,” THE AM. LAW., Sept. 14, 2005. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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involved in legal education, and in particular for those of us who have followed 
students involved in the Pittsburgh-Prishtina partnership, it is difficult not to 
believe in the value of the export of legal education. 
A 2004 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Policy 
Brief noted four “different, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to cross-border 
higher education.”188 They are: 
1) the mutual understanding approach, focused on encouraging the mobility 
of both domestic and foreign students; 
2) the skilled migration approach, emphasizing the recruitment of skilled 
foreign students to remain in the host country after completing their 
education; 
3) the revenue-generating approach, focused on the presence of foreign 
students to add to the income of the educational institution; and 
4) the capacity-building approach, encouraging cross-border education as a 
tool in assisting the student’s home country upon return after the 
completion of the educational stay. 
The U.S. LL.M. process for foreign lawyers exemplifies the fourth of these 
approaches to cross-border education. Kosovar LL.M. graduates from the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law have improved law school curricula at 
home, become better teachers, encouraged the rule of law and ethical conduct of 
lawyers, designed and implemented new legislation, assisted in the administration 
of international development programs, and participated in the preparation of the 
case for the Kosovo declaration of independence at the International Court of 
Justice. 
This capacity-building for Kosovo also promotes the rule of law. The 2007 
IMF Working Paper on Democracy and Foreign Education offered hypotheses for 
how foreign-educated individuals bring about changes in levels of democracy in 
their home countries.189 The hypotheses considered in the IMF Working Paper 
included the following: 
                                                          
 
188 OECD Policy Brief, Internationalisation of Higher Education 4 (2004). 
189 Antonio Spilimbergo, Democracy and Foreign Education, IMF Working Paper AP/07/51, at 22 (Mar. 
2007). 
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1) “foreign-educated technocrats are such a scarce resource in many countries 
that they can impose their own preferences in favor of democratic 
regimes;”190 
2) “foreign-educated leaders seem to be extremely motivated to introduce 
democracy and to keep up with the more developed countries where they 
studied;”191 
3) “foreign-educated individuals make it more difficult for the dictatorial 
regimes to maintain repression by spreading new ideas at home;”192 
4) “foreign-educated individuals can make repressive activities more costly 
for a dictatorial regime since they have easier access to external media;”193 
and 
5) “education abroad may inculcate a sense of common identity with the 
international democratic community.”194 
Each of these hypotheses can be applied as well to explain how U.S. educated law 
professors and lawyers in Kosovo can serve to advance the rule of law. These 
lawyers return to Kosovo as scarce resources to be relied upon for advice and 
expertise in the development and application of the law, as well as in leading the 
reform of legal education. 
8. Concluding Thoughts 
Wade Channell, Senior International Trade Advisor at the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has called U.S.-trained LL.M. graduates who 
return to their home countries “agents of understanding, agents of change, and 
agents of hope.”195 These graduates provide a bridge that facilitates positive legal 
reform that both understands other legal systems and filters the process of change 
in their home countries through a native sensitivity to local cultural needs. While 
many at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law have benefited from the 
presence of Kosovar lawyers in the LL.M. program, the greatest benefit from their 
                                                          
 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Wade Channell, Making a Difference, the Role of the LL.M. in Policy Formulation and Reform, in 
EXPORT, supra note 180, at 13–22. 
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time in Pittsburgh will be felt in Kosovo. Those lawyers have much to contribute 
and will affect legal reform in Kosovo in a positive way for years to come. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  6 6 0  |  V O L .  7 4  |  2 0 1 3  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
L. Cooperation and Reform Through Legal Education: How 
Academic and Nongovernmental Organizations Can Effect 
Sustainable Change 
D. Wes Rist* 
In recent years, there seems to be a greater recognition of international legal 
education programming as a desirable element in legal reform. As Professor Brand 
noted, the IMF has recognized a positive correlation between utilizing such 
programming and the development of the rule of law.196 However, like the field of 
rule of law development itself,197 international legal education programs are not 
coordinated across departmental lines and/or national and regional boundaries. The 
result is different educational programs promoting legal development and reform in 
different ways. Unfortunately, there is little data which provides guidance as to 
which approaches are most productive. 
The lack of data on the long-term effect of international legal education on 
rule of law and legal reform is an acknowledged weakness.198 A study of this effect 
would be complex and intrinsically debatable as there are a large variety of 
methodologies to evaluating legal education reform and its influence on a 
country.199 Attempting to evaluate the bearing of one country’s legal education 
system on multiple jurisdictions would be even more difficult. 
Despite an undeniable need for this kind of research, the international legal 
community should not fixate on how much international legal education has 
affected legal reform—international legal education ought to be included in any 
discussion of rule of law development. Rather, the most important question is: how 
can the international legal community best use international legal education and 
legal education reform to accomplish the goals of greater legal reform? Several key 
                                                          
 
* Director of Education and Research, American Society of International Law. 
196 See supra note 189. 
197 See Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the 
European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 240–71 (2011). 
198 Jon Eddy, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 335 (2011). 
199 See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-Inspired Transplants, 59 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 60 (2009); Lovely Dadgupta, Reforming Indian Legal Education: Linking Research and 
Teaching, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 432 (2010); Luis Fernando Pérez Hurtado, Content, Structure, and 
Growth of Mexican Legal Education, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 567 (2010); Thomas Chih-hsiung Chen, Legal 
Education Reform in Taiwan: Are Japan and Korea the Models?, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32 (2012). 
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factors are essential to any engagement of international legal education as a tool for 
sustainable legal reform. 
1. Partnerships, not Parochialism 
Successful, sustainable collaborations between law faculties in developing 
countries and academic or civil society institutions in the United States require 
more than just funding. At some point, funding resources will diminish or 
disappear. Relationships that are approached with the concept of “helping the 
weaker brother” inevitably generate friction once the lubrication of funded 
programming is removed. 
Lasting partnerships must be built around mutual cooperation and 
engagement. Collaborative activities need to be designed with the unfunded period 
of the relationship in mind. My time at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
repeatedly demonstrated the value of approaching international legal education 
from this long-term perspective. By identifying personal relationships between 
faculty members at each university, planning for non-resource dependent 
programming, and creating open avenues of communication, CILE was able to 
maintain partnerships with academic institutions that had not received dedicated 
funding for nearly a decade. Synthesis, rather than substitution, should be the goal 
of U.S. international legal education practitioners.200 
2. Flexibility, not Formality 
While programs are the foundation of any good development project, they are 
also inherently resource-dependent and can include inflexible procedures that 
quickly become outmoded. Any attempt at effecting sustainable legal reform 
through international legal education must be inherently flexible as the legal 
profession is not a stationary target. The structure of legal education is frequently 
changing, and a nation integrating principles like the Bologna Declaration into their 
educational systems are often still figuring out what its needs are.201 Faculty and 
students committed to pursuing worthwhile programming in cooperation with a 
U.S. partner will drive demand of specific programing in ways that change to 
reflect the needs of the changing legal profession. Partnerships built on a single 
program, a formal agreement, or a memorandum of understanding run the risk of 
failure as key participants move on, specific resources become unavailable, and 
                                                          
 
200 Channell, supra note 195, at 13; Erie, supra note 199, at 61–62. 
201 Julian Lonbay, The Changing Regulatory Environment Affecting the Education and Training of 
Europe’s Lawyers, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 484–85 (2012). 
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demand shifts to reflect a change in the legal profession. Schools simply interested 
in adding “notches on their belt” through formal partnership agreements are poor 
partners when it comes to actually effecting legal reform. It is the faculty members, 
administrators, and students desiring substantive value in a partnership who will 
make worthwhile programming happen, regardless of a piece of paper. 
Formal partnerships have other weaknesses. Administrative costs can be 
significant and regular reporting, maintenance, and renewals create additional staff 
burdens. Sometimes, these agreements are unavoidable, and there are times that 
they can be useful in laying down a structured approach. Frequently, however, 
there is a tendency to put a partnership in writing and then place it on the shelf 
where it fails to deliver on its promise to act as a vibrant contribution to legal 
reform and rule of law development. 
Inherent in this denouncement of pro forma agreements is the need for 
administrative support accompanied by a willingness to commit to change. 
Individuals drive change, not formal agreements. Find people who are committed 
out of a sense of purpose and you will find a partner that will stick with you, even 
during the unfunded spells. 
3. Emergence, not Establishment 
The key to sustainable influence in international legal education and rule of 
law development is finding people who will are committed to help effect that 
change over a long period of time. CILE’s commitment to its original State 
Department funded partners has continued to this day and is reflected best through 
its relationship with the University of Prishtina Faculty of Law in Prishtina, 
Kosovo, the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law in Belgrade, Serbia, and Moi 
University School of law in Eldoret, Kenya.202 All of the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law’s Kosovar LL.M. graduates have returned to their home country, 
and a significant number are engaged in teaching law, either on a full-time or 
adjunct basis, at a number of law faculties and universities within Kosovo. 
By working with its partners to identify, nurture, and develop the next 
generation of legal reformers, CILE has developed a sustainable relationship with 
the breadth of the legal profession in each of these countries. 
                                                          
 
202 See, e.g., Third CLDP Contract and 2010 Summer Program in Croatia Expand CILE Use of Vis 
Moot as a Legal Education Tool, 2009 CILE NOTES 2, available at http://www.law.pitt.edu/files/ 
attached/cile/CILEnotes2009Final.pdf; Having an Impact: The Pitt-Moi Partnership, 2012 CILE NOTES 
4, available at http://www.law.pitt.edu/files/attached/cile/ cilenotes2012replacement.pdf. 
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4. Concrete Suggestions for Sustainable Relationships 
The preceding points are based on my personal experience as Assistant 
Director of CILE for more than five years. Rather than engage in a more thorough 
analysis of these points, I’d rather transition to some concrete examples of 
programming structures that can assist all institutions seeking to build sustainable 
relationships that have an impact on international legal education and legal reform. 
First, students are your greatest resource—for both American and foreign 
institutions. In every class, there are always at least a few students willing to go 
above and beyond the normal expectations to achieve their own personal goals. The 
challenge is to let the student body, as a whole, know that there is support for those 
seeking to participate in international legal education programming. That support 
can take the form of summer internships, study abroad programs, or even simply 
connecting a student on a sightseeing trip with graduates in the area. When the 
students return, take advantage of their experiences; have them contribute to your 
newsletter or the law school’s website; have them present at local organizations 
with similar areas of focus; have them hold an informational session for students to 
answer question about their experiences; and work with them to arrange a special 
lecture or event on the topic they studied. Students are your best publicity and can 
drive future interest in the program. 
Second, American institutions, both civil society and academic, need to look 
for partnerships that help increase buy-in on their long-term goals. CILE has 
partnered with the University of Pittsburgh’s University Center for International 
Studies (UCIS), which serves as a clearinghouse for all things international at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Many of CILE’s partnerships with institutions in Kosovo, 
Serbia, and Ukraine have been maintained through the assistance of fellowships 
UCIS provides to CILE for the support of law students. Programs should always be 
presented in ways that attract the interest of new potential funders and that 
emphasize the opportunity for outside organizations to step into a proven program 
with identifiable results. 
Finally, make sure partnerships are two-way streets. Kosovo and Serbia are 
good examples where CILE has provided benefits to their students, and those 
students—as graduates—have helped CILE find placements for American J.D. 
students interested in spending a summer in the Balkans to gain foreign legal 
experience. Keeping a two-way flow of participation is also the key to finding new 
areas in which to cooperate and identifying those areas where flexibility is essential 
to maintaining the relevancy of the relationship. 
While this review of legal education programs is admittedly anecdotal, it 
reflects experience in maintaining and strengthening relationships between 
academic and civil society institutions and law faculties in transition countries. 
Putting these suggestions into practice will not guarantee that programming will 
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survive through the unfunded periods. But, without true partnerships, intentional 
flexibility, and a focus on emerging leaders, there is no chance that any relationship 
designed to cross cultural, national, legal, and educational divides will survive. 
K O S O V O  A F T E R  T H E  I C J  O P I N I O N   
 
P A G E  |  6 6 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.281 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
M. Developing a Telecommunications Program for the Republic 
of Kosovo 
Martin Weiss, David Tipper, and Robert M. Hayden* 
One of Kosovo’s needs in the wake of the destructive war of the late 1990’s is 
a modern telecommunications infrastructure and career opportunities for the 
unemployed. Telecommunications is a key infrastructure for any country wishing 
to be competitive in the global economy, and education is an important factor in 
building a competitive workforce that will stimulate investment in Kosovo. 
The University of Pittsburgh (Pitt) and the University of Pristina (UP) took 
part in a collaborative project to build a program of study in telecommunications in 
Kosovo. This project lasted from May 2008 to June 2011 and was funded by 
USAID through Higher Education Development program. During the term of this 
project, Pitt assisted the Faculty of Electrical and Communications Engineering at 
UP in developing a modern curriculum to meet their needs; constructing a state-of-
the-art laboratory to support the educational mission of the program; and educating 
three of UP’s junior faculty members at Pitt’s School of Information Sciences for 
one year, where they earned their Masters of Science in Telecommunications 
degree. 
This project was designed to assist with Kosovo’s challenges in human 
resource development and building a close industry-academia partnership in 
Kosovo’s telecom sector. The ultimate goal of this partnership is to improve 
Kosovo’s economy through private sector engagement and workforce 
development. As recent reports on the situation in Kosovo indicate,203 much work 
remains to be done, and it will likely take many years to achieve self-sustaining 
growth. 
There were three key elements to achieve the partnership’s overarching 
objective. The first was to develop and reinforce a relationship between local 
industry and UP’s Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering. The second 
was to demonstrate practice-oriented instruction by inviting UP faculty members to 
                                                          
 
* Martin Weiss is a Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Research, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Information Sciences; David Tipper is an Associate Professor and Director of the 
Graduate Telecommunications Networking Program, University of Pittsburgh School of Information 
Sciences; Robert M. Hayden is a Professor of Anthropology, Law, and Public and International Affairs 
and Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. 
203 USAID, KOSOVO ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/ 
pdf_docs/PNADL767.pdf. 
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Pitt for extended stays. The third was working directly with the UP faculty to 
develop and deliver a program of study in telecommunications. 
Early in the project, UP faculty key to this program visited Pittsburgh for a 
series of intensive meetings. The faculty members were familiarized with Pitt’s 
telecom program and the motivations that drive its structure and approach, as well 
as a deep familiarization with Pitt’s laboratory environment. UP faculty members 
were also introduced to objectives-oriented curriculum design by the Industrial 
Informatics and System Engineering (IISE) faculty. With this background, the UP 
faculty undertook a radical redesign of their curriculum, which resulted in a 
focused set of educational experiences for their prospective students. In addition, 
this design enabled the UP faculty to develop a detailed set of laboratory 
requirements. It is important to point out that the redesigned curriculum was an 
adaption of Pitt’s MST curriculum, not a wholesale adoption, as the UP faculty 
face different requirements and students with different knowledge and skills. 
Soon after faculty returned to Pristina, the first meeting of the Industrial 
Advisory Council (IAC) was convened. The IAC consists of representatives of 
current and emerging telecommunications employers in Kosovo. The IAC 
members and the faculty engaged in an open dialog about the proposed curriculum. 
The IAC offered advice that included specific topics recommended for inclusion 
into the curriculum, a re-ordering of some courses, and a recommendation that the 
language of instruction be English. This “IAC” approach has served as a model for 
relations with local industry for other universities in the region. 
In 2008, the labs at Pitt were completely overhauled, both conceptually and 
physically. The laboratory delivered to Faculty of Electrical and Communications 
Engineering at UP was a modernized version of this lab. The lab was expertly 
assembled in a newly renovated and secured space through investments by UP. The 
assembly of the lab gear was also financed by UP out of their internal funds. 
Assessments were a key element of this project. Early on in the project, a 
member of Pitt’s IISE faculty travelled to Kosovo to conduct a baseline 
assessment. This process was repeated at the end of the project to assess the 
progress of the Faculty of Electrical and Communications Engineering. The report 
noted that many weaknesses and threats in the baseline report were later identified 
as strengths. An external project examiner was also engaged, and he commented 
that the program had been successful, that it had resulted in an excellent 
educational program for the future, and that there was potential for a significant 
impact to the Kosovar labor economy. 
The full impact assessment of this project will be possible by 2013, as 
program graduate outcomes in the marketplace can be more fully determined 
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PART IV—TWENTIETH ANNUAL MCLEAN LECTURE ON 
WORLD LAW: THE ROLE AND POSITION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN SOCIETY: THE CASE OF 
KOSOVO 
The Honorable Dr. Enver Hasani* 
On behalf of myself and on behalf of the institution I presently chair, I am 
delighted and honored to be the keynote speaker in the McLean Lecture series. I 
hope there will be much discussion on the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, which 
is the newest of its kind in Europe. For those who are not familiar with 
constitutional courts, they are modeled upon the idea of constitutional review, 
founded by Hans Kelsen, who has been regarded as one of the most important legal 
scholars of the last century. Constitutional courts are not part of the regular 
judiciary, but they oversee all public authorities, including the regular judiciary. 
The same is true with our court. 
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo is part of the “Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” otherwise known as the Ahtisaari plan. The 
Ahtisaari plan is the international report upon which Kosovo declared its 
independence on February 17, 2008. This plan was the result of several years of 
negotiation between Pristina and Belgrade, as mediated by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, 
former President of the Republic of Finland, who had been appointed by United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Special Envoy for the Future Status 
Process for Kosovo. It was supposed to eventually be ratified by the UN Security 
Council, but Russia exercised its veto, so the plan was unilaterally accepted by 
Kosovo, and Kosovo declared its independence. Based on this, Kosovo adopted its 
own constitution, which came into effect on June 15, 2008. In general, one would 
associate our Constitution as having been modeled upon the highest, Western legal 
standards on constitutional law. The courts are obliged to act in accordance with it. 
The Constitution is a source of fundamental rights and freedoms for the 
people of Kosovo. This is evident in Chapter II, which provides that human rights 
and liberal, fundamental freedoms are inalienable, indivisible, and invaluable. This 
is the defining section of the entire text of the Constitution and is the foundation of 
the legal order of Kosovo. 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo has other European 
counterparts. It is modeled upon the laws, more or less, of other southeast European 
                                                          
 
* President Judge of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo. 
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constitutional courts—all of them having similar, but separate laws. The 
Constitutional Court became operational in September 2009, although we were 
sworn in during June of the same year. Its main function is abstract ruling 
jurisdiction. However, the case law of the court is not based on the referrals 
regarding abstract ruling jurisdiction but on Article 103.7, which we refer to as 
“human rights jurisdiction” or “jurisdiction of human rights.” Our Constitution says 
in Article 53 that every ruling of every public authority in Kosovo (including the 
constitutional court) regarding human rights should be interpreted based on the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR’s website 
includes its decisions in English, Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish. Our working 
language, since we have international colleagues, is usually English. With the 
exception of one judge and two staff members from the administration, everyone 
speaks English. Most of them were educated abroad and can also speak French, 
German, or Swedish depending on the country where they were educated. 
Statistics show that citizens have an increased confidence in the 
Constitutional Court due to efficient, effective, and impartial work. From 2009 to 
2012, the Constitutional Court received many referrals. We saw an increase of 
24.55% of submitted referrals in 2011 compared to 2010. We have received 450 
referrals this year, and we expect that we will complete almost 90% of them, if not 
more, by the end of the year. This is an impressive figure by all standards for those 
who are familiar with Kosovo. It is also impressive for the region when you 
compare it to other constitutional courts. The current status of our cases, as of early 
November 2012, is 170 solved cases, five cases carried over from 2010, and 26 
cases carried over from 2011. The total number of unsolved cases in 2012 is 76, 
which is not a large number. 
All citizens of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnicity or religion, have equal 
access to the Constitutional Court. The number of community members submitting 
referrals has shown confidence in the Constitutional Court. This has to do with the 
Court’s various activities in the community, including outreach meetings. During 
the first months, we conducted outreach meetings with all authorized parties, 
including central authorities, municipal authorities, the legal community, and 
citizens, telling them what we are and what we are not. We did this because we 
were afraid that we might be overrun by cases because we were a new court and the 
existing court system did not have a good name, having shared the same destiny as 
other former communist countries. If people thought that we could be a court of 
first instance, which we are not, we could get overwhelmed. 
The Constitutional Court is an exceptional court. We review cases when there 
has been a constitutional violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
Kosovo citizens. In order for that to happen, parties are required to exhaust all legal 
remedies available within the system first. The last legal remedy is always the 
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Supreme Court. Within four months a decision of the Supreme Court, parties can 
come before us and allege their problem and violation. Most of the time, as you 
will see, cases are admissible on procedural grounds or because they present prima 
facie legitimate cases. Our Court does not change the result unless it was achieved 
through unconstitutional means, which rarely happens. 
Other Kosovo courts may raise any issue before the Constitutional Court 
while there is a case of controversy before them. If the application of the law would 
cause a potential constitutional violation, they should stop the proceedings and 
bring the case before us, with a legal opinion from the trial court that would explain 
why it thinks the law is unconstitutional. So far, we have only had one case (the 
“expropriation cases”) where the Supreme Court was wrong and the law it had 
challenged was constitutional. The arguments they based their referral on were that 
the workload was too high and that it would be better if some of the expropriation 
cases could be heard by other trial courts of first and second instance. Of course, 
we didn’t accept that argument because it is a not a constitutional argument. 
So who are the commonly alleged violators of the Kosovo Constitution? The 
courts and the police are the subjects of the most cases, but private individuals are 
too, especially if you include the international presence, which is still in Kosovo. 
Municipalities, state bodies, and other public authorities have also been challenged 
as alleged violators. 
What are the alleged constitutional violations? Most of the time, the alleged 
violation is the prevention of equality before law. Other alleged violations deal 
with the review of court decisions; decisions of the state; the right to work; 
clarification of judgments; the right to free and fair trial; the right to a pension; and 
the right to property. 
With respect to decisions in continental legal culture, some (I would say 
pretty much most) countries make a distinction between judicial judgments and 
resolutions. A judgment determines the merits of the case. So far, 96 out of the 
more than 450 referrals we received this year have or will result in judgments. 
Resolutions result primarily from cases that have been deemed inadmissible on 
procedural grounds. These cases are either brought prematurely, before the party 
has exhausted other legal remedies, or the parties have missed the time limit, which 
is up to five months. These inadmissibility decisions reflect the highest number of 
decisions we see, which is standard in all European constitutional courts, both East 
and West. 
Despite the large number of inadmissibility decisions, there has been an 
increase in issued judgments. This is the result of our outreach to the public and all 
authorized parties. Authorized parties are called that because they should follow 
certain procedures in order to file a case legally and properly before us. As far as 
implementation of the court’s decisions, the court has a good record compared with 
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other regular courts. Recently, we have seen tendencies from the Supreme Court to, 
in a sense, obstruct the implementation of our decisions; meaning that the Supreme 
Court has tried to say that it could remedy their decisions when we have reviewed 
their judgments and remanded them for reconsideration. In those instances, they 
seem to have thought that their legal interpretation was initially sound and that they 
could reach the same result pursuant to different legal means. In private 
discussions, we have convinced them that it is the Constitution that prevails, not 
other law. Our constitutional interpretation is the legal reasoning not obiter dicta. 
We told the Supreme Court judges that when we remand a case and give legal 
reasoning interpreting the Constitution, they should obey that and the end result 
should be fixing the constitutional violation that was found by Constitutional 
Court. 
The way the Supreme Court does its job is a matter of their jurisdiction, not 
ours. We cannot change their decision; they must do it. They should follow the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court and fix the constitutional violation. Unless 
that is done, it is considered an obstruction of justice and a misuse of the judicial 
function. 
I would like briefly to discuss certain cases which I would say make up the 
core cases of our case law. There are five to ten that establish the current identity of 
and indicate the integrity of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. I 
will, however, mention only two. 
The first case dealt with prepaid television service. We issued an interim 
order and by the time we re-opened the case for deliberation, it had become moot 
because the Ahtisaari Plan changed the law and was then consistent with our 
interim measure. The second is the PAK case, which involved the Privatization 
Agency of Kosovo. It addressed a human rights violation of the right to free and 
fair trial. The reasoning of the Court was very eloquent and stated that the Special 
Chamber, which acts within the Kosovo Supreme Court and is composed of and 
dominated by the internationals, does not have original jurisdiction, but that its 
jurisdiction stems from the laws of Kosovo and from the very independence 
declared on behalf of Kosovo. The Constitutional Court told the Special Chamber 
that it is not part and parcel of the constitution legal order of Kosovo and they 
therefore had no right to pick and choose the laws of Kosovo that they would 
apply. They have full discretion in the way they judge, but only in accordance with 
the laws in force and enacted by the Kosovo Assembly. The entire philosophy of 
the Constitutional Court in this case was based on the ruling of the International 
Court of Justice, which was based on the original powers of the sovereign—the 
people—or in legal terms, constitutional terms. They created an assembly, 
government, presidency, courts, and judges who enacted the laws and legal 
infrastructure of a country, which is sovereign and independent. This authority does 
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not derive from United Nations Resolution 1244, but from the vote which took 
place on the eve of the Declaration of Kosovo’s independence. 
